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THE EXTRAORDINARY EXECUTION OF BILLY VICKERS,
THE BANALITY OF DEATH, AND
THE DEMISE OF POST-CONVICTION REVIEW
David R. Dow, Jim Marcus, Morris Moon, Jared Tyler, and Greg Wiercioch*
Accordingly, § 1983 challenges to an impending execution (like §
1983 challenges to a state's method of execution or § 1983 challenges
seeking immediate or speedier release from prison) must be brought
as habeas actions.'
Whether a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a death-
sentenced state prisoner, who seeks to stay his execution in order to
pursue a challenge to the procedures for carrying out the execution,
is properly recharacterized as a habeas corpus petition under
28 U.S.C. § 2254?2
On Tuesday, December 9, 2003, the State of Texas played Russian Roulette
with Billy Vickers. Early that afternoon prison authorities removed him from his
cell on death row at the Polunsky Unit in Livingston, Texas, and drove him to the
Walls Unit - sometimes known as the death house, in Huntsville. They placed
Vickers in a holding cell outside the execution chamber, where he would spend his
final hours, in anticipation of a six o'clock execution. Vickers ate his last meal,
thanked his lawyer, and said his good-byes. Every time Vickers heard a commotion,
it was a hammer falling on an empty chamber. Midnight arrived and Vickers was
still alive - the death warrant had expired. Prison authorities loaded Vickers back
into a van and returned him to death row. A month and a half later, on Wednesday,
January 28, 2004, at shortly after 6:00 p.m. local time, the State of Texas finally
* Dow is the Distinguished University Professor at the University of Houston Law
Center and the Director of the Texas Innocence Network (TIN). Marcus is the Executive
Director of the Texas Defender Service (TDS). Moon is a staff attorney at TDS. Tyler is the
Assistant Director of the TIN. Wiercioch is a staff attorney at TDS. The authors represented
Billy Vickers, as well as Kenneth Bruce and Kevin Zimmerman, in his lethal injection
litigation. Therefore, factual knowledge of his case, and others', contained in this Article was
gained through first-hand exposure.
' Martinez v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, 292 F.3d 417,423 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1091 (2002).
2 This was the question presented in the petition for writ of certiorari in Nelson v.
Campbell, 347 F.3d 910 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003).
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executed the convicted murderer. He was the fourth person executed in Texas in
2004, and the 317th since the death penalty resumed in 1982.' Vickers was a so-
called career criminal. Prior to being convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death in 1993 for murdering Phillip Kinslow in the course of a robbery, Vickers had
been twice convicted of burglary, twice convicted of being a felon in possession of
burglary tools, and convicted of arson and conspiracy to commit arson.5 The
evidence that he killed Kinslow was substantial.6 On the gurney on the evening of
January 28, Vickers claimed responsibility for having committed as many as a dozen
other murders in addition to the one for which he was being put to death.7 Perhaps
he was simply sticking his finger in the state's eye. Regardless, Vickers was not a
good person. He committed at least one murder and maybe quite a few more.' His
case has nothing to do with actual innocence. It deals instead with how the legal
system operates in ordinary death penalty cases, in those that are banal, in cases
where a death row inmate's constitutional rights are ignored, but where the victim
of the constitutional violation does not raise a claim of innocence. In this Article,
by focusing on the Vickers litigation, we illustrate how our legal system operates
when a death row inmate says, "I committed the crime but you have treated me
unconstitutionally."
I. MARTINEZ, NELSON, AND THE DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
Habeas corpus litigation permits a prisoner to attack the legality of his
conviction or his sentence. 9 According to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner "only on the ground that
he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."' This provision has been construed to encompass challenges to the legality
of the conviction as well as the legality of the sentence." Hence, even a death row
' For an account of Vickers's execution, the facts surrounding his crime, the procedural
history of his case, and his prior criminal record, see Billy Frank Vickers, at http://www.clark-






9 Throughout, we use the masculine pronoun simply to reflect that the vast majority of
death row inmates are men. See Texas Department of Criminal Justice, at http://www.td-
cj.state.tx.us/stat/racial.htm (reporting the gender statistics of death row offenders).
'0 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).
See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ
of Habeas Corpus, 49 DuKE L.J. 947, 966-67 n.79 (2000); Habeas Relief for Federal
Prisoners, 91 GEO. L.J. 862 (2003).
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inmate who does not claim innocence of the crime can attack the validity of his
death sentence in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 2
Although as a matter of federal law, death row inmates are not entitled to post-
conviction counsel, 3 at around the same time that Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 4 many states
simultaneously passed laws providing post-conviction representation to death row
inmates in connection with their state habeas litigation. These state laws typically
guarantee that death row inmates receive competent post-conviction counsel. 5
Because a death row inmate who fails to raise valid constitutional claims on his first
trip through state court will ordinarily not be permitted to raise them in later state
court proceedings, 6 and because a death row inmate who fails to raise a given issue
in state court will ordinarily be precluded from subsequently raising that issue in
federal court, 7 a death row inmate who does not have a highly competent lawyer in
his state post-conviction proceedings will almost certainly never obtain federal
review of the merits of his claims."' Put differently, if a death row inmate's state
habeas lawyer is less than fully competent, and neglects to raise certain claims in
state post-conviction proceedings, the ability of the inmate to raise those claims later
will be forever lost, no matter how compelling the claims, and no matter how
dogged the subsequent lawyers may be.
Like most states with the death penalty, Texas enacted a statute guaranteeing
death row inmates competent post-conviction lawyers. '9 Studies indicate, however,
that the quality of lawyers provided pursuant to this statute is rather uneven.2" An
12 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
'3 See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1
(1989).
4 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
'" See, e.g., Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and
Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 59-60
(2002); Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of Capital
Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications ofStatutory Grants of Capital Counsel,
2003 Wis. L. REV. 31, 36 (discussing "whether, and to what extent, the government's
decision to provide postconviction counsel triggers a constitutional obligation to provide
effective assistance of counser').
16 See generally John H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death by Default: State
Procedural Default Doctrine in Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REv. 1, 40-42 & nn.214-17
(1998); Hammel, supra note 15, at 12-13 & nn.98-99.
'7 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
" See Hammel, supra note 15, at 11-13.
'9 See TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.071, § 2(a) (Vernon 1971). But see Exparte
Graves, 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that statutory guarantee of
"competent" counsel does not guarantee a certain level of performance).
20 See TEXAS DEFENDER SERVICE, LETHAL INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL COMBINATION OF
INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYS AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS IN TEXAS DEATH PENALTY
2004]
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exhaustive examination of all state habeas petitions filed between 1995 and 2001
revealed, for example, that lawyers filed motions for discovery in only twelve
percent of the cases, despite the statutory requirement of a diligent investigation.2 1
Fifteen percent of the state habeas petitions were fifteen pages long or shorter, and
an astonishing nine percent were ten pages or fewer.22 In more than two-thirds of
the cases, there were no materials indicating the performance of an investigation
outside the record. 23 At least two lawyers appointed to represent death row inmates
in Texas acknowledged after filing state habeas petitions that they were entirely
unqualified to do so.24
The price paid by the death row inmates for their lawyers' ineptitude was
staggeringly high: they forfeited all opportunities to have a federal court review
the merits of their claims. Consequently, in early 2002, three Texas death row
inmates - Johnny Martinez, Gary Etheridge, and Napoleon Beazley - all of whom
had received incompetent state post-conviction counsel,25 resulting in the default
of compelling legal claims, filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 198326
arguing that the State of Texas, by providing inept post-conviction counsel,
deprived them of access to the courts. Simply stated, the lawsuit alleged that the
State of Texas in effect precluded these inmates from obtaining federal review in
habeas corpus proceedings by assigning them counsel who caused all their claims
to be defaulted or waived. The Fifth Circuit held that a suit under § 1983 was not
available to these inmatesY.2  The court's language in Martinez was broad.28 The
court held that a death row inmate could not challenge any aspect of his sentence
through a § 1983 action; the sole procedural vehicle that could be used is the writ
of habeas corpus.29
APPEALS (2002) (a report prepared by the Texas Defender Service reviewing the Texas state
post-conviction process), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/resources.htm (last
visited Feb. 16, 2005).
21 Id. at 13.
22 id. at 14.
23 id. at 15.
24 Id. at 25 (discussing the lawyer for Ricky Kerr who acknowledged that he may have
been incompetent regarding his client's matter); id. at 32 (discussing the lawyer for Johnny
Martinez who admitted to the courts that he had never "handled a state Habeas Corpus Writ
of a death penalty case").
25 See id. at 30-38.
26 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
27 See Martinez v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals, 292 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 1091 (2002).
28 See supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting one of the broadest statements in the
Martinez opinion).
29 Martinez, 292 F.3d at 424.
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The federal circuits are split on the issue that the Fifth Circuit addressed in
Martinez.3 ° Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did not immediately take any steps to
resolve the split. However, during the October 2003 Term, the Supreme Court
agreed to decide Nelson v. Campbell.3' The precise question the Court agreed to
resolve was: "[w]hether a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C § 1983 by a death-
sentenced state prisoner, who seeks to stay his execution in order to pursue a
challenge to the procedures for carrying out the execution, is properly recharac-
terized as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C § 2254?", 2 It was obvious that
the Supreme Court's resolution of the question presented in Nelson would have
some impact on the Fifth Circuit's rule as articulated in Martinez.
In November 2003, shortly before the grant of certiorari in Nelson, a number of
death penalty lawyers from around the country began to talk seriously about
challenging the particular mix of chemicals that many states use to administer a
lethal injection.33 The issue had already received attention in the academic
literature,34 but had not yet been widely litigated in federal post-conviction
proceedings. Important legislative developments suggested that one of the drugs
used in carrying out executions might well run afoul of the "evolving standards of
decency" norm embodied in the Eighth Amendment.35 A challenge to the particular
chemical cocktail, however, is not a challenge to either the conviction or the
sentence. These inmates were not arguing that lethal injection is inherently
unconstitutional, but simply that the specific chemicals that certain states intended
to use to carry out the lethal injections caused unnecessary pain and torture in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Consequently, the lawsuit did not appear to be
30 In contrast to the Fifth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit has held that a stay of execution may
be obtained in an action under § 1983. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Brownlee, 103 F.3d 708, 710
(8th Cir. 1997).
31 540 U.S. 1046 (2003).
32 Id.
13 Howard Witt, Pain of Execution Debated; Drug Used on Humans Deemed Unfit for
Dogs, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 21, 2004, at 8 ("A recent series of legal challenges in a half-dozen
states... has raised stark new questions about the execution process .. "). Gary Clement,
of the Louisiana Capital Assistance Center, and his colleagues have been at the forefront of
developing the legal basis for the challenge to lethal injection described in this Article.
14 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82
IOWA L. REV. 319 (1997); Julian Davis Mortenson, Earning the Right to Be Retributive:
Execution Methods, Culpability Theory, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 88
IOWA L. REv. 1099 (2003).
" The phrase "evolving standards of decency" originated in the non-death penalty case,
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). The idea underlying this phrase, however, has been
present in death penalty jurisprudence since the dawn of the modern death penalty era. See,
e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 388-89 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968).
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one that could warrant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because the inmates were not
challenging the legality of their confinement.36 The obvious vehicle for bringing
this challenge was 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Yet, the problem with an action under § 1983
was that cases, like Martinez, had held that a challenge to the mode of execution
could not be brought in an action under § 1983. The conjunction of the language
of § 2254 coupled with the broad language of Martinez left death row inmates with
no obvious legal recourse. The manner by which states intended to carry out lethal
injections seemed to raise serious constitutional questions, but there was no apparent
legal vehicle for bringing an appropriate challenge. Then, on December 1, 2003, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Nelson.37
IH. A SHORT HISTORY OF VICKERS'S FINAL FIFTY DAYS
No central authority sets execution dates in Texas. Instead, the presiding judge
of the court where the death row inmate was convicted sets the date, usually upon
being asked to do so by the district attorney for that county.38 Until the mid-1990s,
execution warrants quaintly directed the warden to carry out an execution "before
sunrise" on a given date, meaning that executions occurred between midnight and
dawn. In 1995, Texas began to carry out executions after 6:00 p.m.; thus, execution
warrants in Texas now direct the warden to carry out an execution "after 6:00 p.m."
on a given day. Whereas prior to 1995, prison authorities could carry out an
execution in the roughly six-hour window between midnight and dawn, prison
authorities must now carry out executions between 6:00 p.m. and midnight. Texas
had scheduled three executions for the week of December 8, 2003: Billy Vickers
was scheduled to be executed after 6:00 p.m. on Tuesday, December 9,2003; Kevin
Zimmerman was scheduled for execution on Wednesday, December 10, 2003; and
Bobby Hines was scheduled to be executed on Thursday, December 11, 2003. On
Monday, December 8, 2003 - just one week following the grant of certiorari in
Nelson - Vickers, along with Zimmerman and Hines, filed a lawsuit in federal
district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to enjoin the use of a particular
array of chemicals for executing death-sentenced inmates in Texas.3 9 The substance
36 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may only entertain a claim for habeas
relief on behalf of an inmate who claims to be "in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). See, e.g., Sylvester v. Hanks,
140 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1998) (questioning whether § 2254 is the proper remedy when
petitioner claims his custody should take one form - prison's general population - rather
than another - segregation - because § 2254 is only an appropriate remedy when a
petitioner attacks fact or duration of custody).
3 540 U.S 1046 (2003).
38 Scheduled Executions, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, at http://www.td-
cj.state.tx.usfstat/scheduledexecutions.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
" See Hines v. Johnson, 83 Fed. Appx. 592 (5th Cir. 2003).
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of the Eighth Amendment claim will be discussed in greater detail below. 4° The
immediate point is that the lawyers for the three inmates filing the suit believed that
the issue was not ripe until an execution date had been set and, further, that the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Nelson had called into question the continuing
vitality of Martinez.4 ' Martinez had held that an action under § 1983 could not be
used to challenge an execution; 42 Nelson was going to address precisely that
question. The lawyers also believed that the suit was not properly brought as a
habeas action because none of the death row inmates challenged the legality of his
conviction or sentence; all conceded that the State could execute them. They
insisted, however, that the lethal injection had to occur without the use of a chemical
that would cause torture.
The AEDPA generally precludes death row inmates from bringing more than
one habeas action. In order to obtain habeas review following the original habeas
action, a prisoner must pass through the gate-keeping provision of 28 U.S.C. §
2244."' A death row inmate who has filed one federal habeas petition and wishes
to file another must first file a motion for authorization in the appropriate court of
appeals. 44 Absent a motion for authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction
over the habeas petition.45 Moreover, the courts of appeals are tightly circumscribed
with respect to their power to grant a motion for authorization. The statute
precludes a court of appeals from authorizing a second or subsequent habeas petition
unless the petitioner shows either: (i) that the Supreme Court has announced a
retroactively applicable new rule, 6 or (ii) that new facts, which could not have been
previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence, tend to establish the
inmate's innocence.4 7
Vickers was stymied by the statute. Invoking Martinez," the district court
characterized the suit brought by Vickers49 as a successive habeas petition. The
4o See infra text accompanying notes 99-145.
See Hines, 83 Fed. Appx. at 592-93 (stating that the court is "keenly aware that the
Supreme Court has under consideration the procedural question whether § 1983 is available
as a vehicle for mounting attacks such as this").
42 See Martinez, 292 F.3d 417.
41 We discuss § 2244 in greater detail below. In this paragraph we simply summarize its
pertinent provisions.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) (2000) ("Before a second or successive application
permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appro-
priate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.").
" See, e.g., United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
496 (2003).
46 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (2000).
47 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2000).
48 In Martinez, the Fifth Circuit ruled that "§ 1983 challenges to an impending execution
(like § 1983 challenges to a state's method of execution or § 1983 challenges seeking imme-
diate or speedier release from prison) must be brought as habeas actions." 292 F.3d at 423.
49 Although the lead plaintiff in the suit was actually a death row inmate, Bobby A.
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district court reasoned that because the action brought by Vickers was a habeas
petition, rather than a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it was required to pass through
the § 2244 gateway. Because it had not done so, the district court concluded that it
lacked jurisdiction. The district court therefore dismissed the action on December
8, a day before the scheduled execution.5" In his district court pleadings, Vickers
had argued that Martinez was not controlling because he was not challenging the
mode or method of his execution; that is he was not claiming that lethal injection is
a categorically cruel and unusual punishment. Moreover, and perhaps more critically,
Vickers insisted that with respect to the threshold jurisdictional question - the
question of whether the precise challenge he was seeking to bring could be brought
under § 1983 - the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Nelson had cast serious
doubt upon the validity of Martinez and the execution should therefore be stayed
pending the Supreme Court's disposition of Nelson. The suit therefore comprised
two distinct strands. The substantive strand revolved around the claim that the partic-
ular chemical combination that the State intended to use to effectuate the execution
violated the Eighth Amendment. The procedural strand turned on the issue of how
the substantive question could be raised.5' But the district court mechanically cited
Martinez without addressing the particulars of Vickers's argument.
Vickers's lawyers had not expected to have any better luck on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit, a court of appeals that is famously inhospitable to claims brought by
death row inmates. Yet at 1:30 on the afternoon of December 9, the date of the
scheduled execution, the Fifth Circuit issued an unusual opinion.52 The court of
appeals stated that it is was "keenly aware that the Supreme Court has under
Hines, whose execution was stayed pending resolution of his Atkins claim, Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), we refer to the suit brought by Billy F. Vickers because the
circumstances of his case were the most striking.
5o See Billy Frank Vickers, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htnml/deathl/US/vickers-
893.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
5' In May 2004, less than two months after the case was argued, the Supreme Court
issued a unanimous opinion in Nelson. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004). In an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court held that because Nelson's suit did not call into
question the validity of his sentence, and because Nelson's challenge would not "necessarily
prevent" the state from going forward with the execution, it was properly brought under §
1983. See 124 S.Ct. at 2123, 2125. Of course, it is also true that Vickers's challenge did not
call into question the validity of his sentence, and even if he had prevailed, the State of Texas
could have gone forward with the execution (albeit with a different combination of
chemicals). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Nelson, Texas death row inmate
David Harris filed a suit under § 1983, raising the same lethal injection challenge that
Vickers had. The federal district court granted a temporary restraining order. The Fifth
Circuit assumed that in view of Nelson, the case was properly brought under § 1983, but it
vacated the temporary restraining order, holding that Harris was not entitled under equitable
principles to the relief he sought. Harris v. Johnson, 376 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2004), reversing
323 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Tex.).
52 Hines v. Johnson, 83 Fed. Appx. 592 (5th Cir. 2003).
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consideration the procedural question whether § 1983 is available as a vehicle for
mounting attacks such as this; but until a different rule is announced, we continue
to follow the procedure described by the district court., 53 Moreover, with respect
to the merits of the underlying Eighth Amendment claim, the Fifth Circuit's opinion
was also far from dismissive. The court noted, "[s]ubstantively, [Vickers has]
submitted evidence that appears to be facially stronger than that which has supported
prior complaints of this nature; but we are not in a posture to deal further with it
under our present precedent."' As Vickers's lawyers read the panel's opinion, the
court was signaling that it found the merits of the challenge intriguing, but was
precluded by circuit precedent from examining the merits." The panel also noted
that the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Nelson did seem to implicate the very
circuit precedent that prevented it from inquiring further into the merits.5 6 The Fifth
Circuit issued its opinion at approximately 3:30 p.m. on December 9, 2003, the day
of Vickers's scheduled execution. Although Vickers's lawyers had originally
planned to seek immediate review in the Supreme Court, the language of the panel's
opinion seemed to invite counsel to request en banc review. Consequently, at
around 4:00 p.m. on December 9, Vickers's lawyers filed a motion seeking that the
Fifth Circuit take the case en banc.
The Fifth Circuit is accustomed to deciding death penalty cases under the
pressure of execution deadlines. Indeed, in the not-so-distant past, Texas used
execution dates to drive death penalty litigation. By setting an execution date, the
State coerces the courts to adjudicate cases faster than they otherwise might. This
practice has provoked condemnation from some judges on the Fifth Circuit,
including those not typically solicitous to claims brought by death row inmates.57
The short of it is that the Fifth Circuit is a well-oiled machine when it comes to
disposing of death penalty cases quickly to permit an execution to proceed on
schedule. Yet at five o'clock there was still no decision on the motion for en banc
review. Then it was 6:00, 6:30, 7:00 p.m., and still nothing. Vickers's lawyers
concluded that the Fifth Circuit had to be on the verge of granting en banc review,
and that someone was writing a dissenting opinion, which was causing the delay.
There was no other explanation for the silence. At around eight o'clock, two hours
into the execution window, the clerk of the court phoned Vickers' s lawyers and the
Attorney General's office. The clerk announced that the Fifth Circuit would be
taking no further action on the case that evening. Everyone on the phone, Vickers' s
" Id. at 592.
54 Id.
" Even in death penalty cases, the Fifth Circuit follows the practice of all the federal
circuits whereby a panel of the court is bound by a prior panel's resolution of the legal issue
presented. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 162, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1997).
16 Hines, 83 Fed. Appx. 592.
"' See David R. Dow, The State, the Death Penalty, and Carl Johnson, 37 B.C. L. REV.
691, 705-06 & nn.41 & 42 (1996) (discussing criticism of Judges Reavley and Jones).
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lawyers and the State's lawyers as well, were utterly nonplussed. The warden was
holding a valid execution warrant directing him to carry out the execution before
midnight, and the Fifth Circuit was going home. Vickers's lawyers asked the clerk
whether a motion could be filed with the panel, requesting that the panel stay the
execution until the en banc court issued an order the following day. The clerk's
response was that Vickers could file anything he wanted, but the Fifth Circuit would
be taking no further action that day. The clerk reminded counsel that because there
was no stay in effect, the State was free to go forward with the execution.
At the same time that Vickers's lawyers had requested en banc review in the
Fifth Circuit, they had lodged a stay motion with the Supreme Court. Under this
practice, lawyers can provide the clerk of the Court with pleadings that they will
later file, so that the pleadings are already at the Court and are ready for distribution
to the Justices' chambers. Following the conference call, counsel for the parties
engaged in a series of discussions regarding the appropriate course of action in light
of the court of appeals's unprecedented action. The Attorney General agreed that
it would be inappropriate to execute Vickers under the circumstances. The Attorney
General informed Vickers's counsel that she would advise the warden not to carry
out the execution. Vickers's lawyers asked whether she would put that in writing,
and she declined to do so." Vickers's lawyers then asked whether she could assure
them that the warden would heed her advice. The Attorney General told them she
could not. Finally, Vickers's lawyers attempted to speak directly with the warden,
to ask him whether he intended to follow the advice of his lawyers in the Attorney
General's office, but Vickers' s lawyers were denied permission to speak directly to
the warden.
By this time it was 10:00 p.m. Vickers's lawyers had two choices: do nothing,
or inform the clerk at the Supreme Court that they wished to file the stay motion that
they had lodged with the Court earlier that day. The advantage of filing the stay
motion was that if the Court granted it, everyone could go home for the evening; the
disadvantage was that if the Court denied it, the warden might perceive that he had
been authorized to go forward with the execution. Vickers's counsel decided to do
nothing. Two hours later, the execution had not been carried out, and the execution
warrant expired.5 9 Vickers was returned to death row.
Although the prison had apparently abandoned its plan to execute Vickers as
early as 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. that evening, if not before, this fact was never
communicated to Vickers. Not until moments prior to midnight did he learn that he
would live to see the next day. Every time he heard a commotion, he thought they
58 It was not terribly unreasonable for the Attorney General's office to be reluctant to
indicate in writing that it had advised its client to defy a court order, even though defiance
of that order was undoubtedly appropriate.
59 Texas Execution Information Center, Billy Vickers, at http://www.txexecutions.org/
reports/317.asp (Jan. 29, 2004).
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were coming for him. Vickers committed a vile crime, and it might be difficult to
feel much sympathy for someone like him, but the United States Constitution
prohibits torture,60 even if the torture victim committed atrocious acts.
Vickers could relax a bit on December 10, 2003, but his lawyers could not, and
neither could Kevin Zimmerman, because Zimmerman's execution was scheduled
for December 10, and the same lawyers who represented Vickers also represented
Zimmerman. Zimmerman and Vickers were both parties to the motion for rehearing
that the Fifth Circuit had gone home the night before without resolving.
Zimmerman's lawyers were hopeful on December 10 that the court would issue an
order early in the day announcing that the en banc court would review the case.
Instead, the clock started ticking again. At 10:00 a.m. the Fifth Circuit had not
issued an order. Then it was 11:00 a.m., noon, and 1:00 p.m. Zimmerman's lawyers
decided that if the Fifth Circuit had not taken some action by 4:00 p.m., a stay
motion would be filed with the Supreme Court. The view was that it was too risky
to put Zimmerman through what Vickers had gone through the day before. 6 At
3:30 p.m., the Fifth Circuit finally ruled. The court issued a boiler-plate order
denying en banc review. Why it took nearly twenty-four hours for the court to
produce the order that it ordinarily issues within a couple of hours after the motion
for en banc review gets filed is anybody's guess. Zimmerman's lawyers filed a stay
motion with the Supreme Court. At twenty minutes before six, Justice Scalia
entered an order halting the execution. For several days, it appeared as though the
challenge to the lethal injection combination would either cause the state to alter the
chemical cocktail, or cause the execution process temporarily to halt. That appear-
ance, however, survived for a mere four days. The following Monday, the full
Court, by a vote of five-to-four, vacated the stay that Justice Scalia had issued the
preceding Wednesday.
62
Neither Vickers nor Zimmerman had ever filed a petition for writ of certiorari.
On Friday, December 12, 2003, three days before the Court dissolved the stay in
Zimmerman's case, Vickers's counsel informed the district attorney and the trial
judge that Vickers would in fact be filing such a petition. When, on the following
Monday, the Supreme Court vacated the stay it had issued for Zimmerman,6 3
Vickers and Zimmerman were obviously disappointed, but four dissenting votes
caused the lawyers to be hopeful concerning the prospects for the Court's granting
the petition for writ of certiorari. 64 Nevertheless, despite knowing that Vickers's
60 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
61 This reluctance to place Zimmerman in the position Vickers had occupied was
augmented by a rumor that the Governor's office, in contrast to the Attorney General's
office, had been urging that the execution of Vickers go forward the night before.
62 See Zimmerman v. Johnson, 540 U.S. 1087 (2003).
63 Id.
6" By convention, the Court grants certiorari upon the affirmative vote of four Justices,
although a smaller number is sometimes sufficient. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME
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counsel intended to seek certiorari review, and despite knowing that four Justices
had dissented from the dissolution of the Zimmerman stay, the State of Texas, on
December 16, 2003, without holding a hearing or discussing the matter with
Vickers's counsel, rescheduled Vickers's execution for January 28, 2004. At around
the same time, Zimmerman's execution was set for January 21, 2004. A third death
row inmate, Kenneth Bruce, was set for execution on January 14, 2004.65
The week after Vickers was originally scheduled to die, the State of Virginia set
an execution date for James Reid.' Using an approach similar to the one that
lawyers for Vickers and Zimmerman had employed in Texas, lawyers for Reid in
Virginia filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging not only the specific
chemical mixture that would be used to carry out the execution, but also the legality
of the so-called cut-down procedure - the same procedure that had been implicated
in the Nelson case from Alabama.67 A panel of the Fourth Circuit stayed Reid's
execution on December 17, 2003.6' The Fourth Circuit observed that the juris-
dictional issue presented by Reid was similar if not identical to the issue the
Supreme Court was going to decide in Nelson, and that it was therefore appropriate
to stay the Reid execution pending Nelson. The Virginia Attorney General asked
the Supreme Court to vacate the Fourth Circuit's stay, but, on December 18, 2003,
the Supreme Court refused.'
The picture on December 19, 2003, was therefore somewhat opaque. The Court
had granted certiorari in Nelson, but had then dissolved the stay in Zimmerman's
case, even though the case presented the same jurisdictional question. Three days
later, the Court refused to dissolve a stay in the Reid case. It was not entirely clear
what was going on. Nevertheless, the certiorari grant in Nelson coupled with the
Court's refusal to permit the Reid execution to go forward seemed significant.
Consequently, lawyers for Vickers and Zimmerman filed a second motion for
rehearing in the Fifth Circuit, apprising that court of the Fourth Circuit's action in
Reid, and the Supreme Court's refusal to intervene. The Fifth Circuit does not
prohibit parties from filing a second motion for rehearing, and a review of the
COURT PRACTICE 261-62 (6th ed. 1986); Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan,
Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1068-1109 (1988)
(discussing the Supreme Court's practice for granting certiorari). In contrast to a petition for
writ of certiorari, a motion for a stay of execution requires five votes. S. REP. No. 107-315,
at 33-34 (2002).
65 See Kenneth Eugene Bruce, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htm/death/US/
bruce891.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
6' See James Reid, at http://www.vadp.org/cases/reid.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
This website provides information regarding the crime Reid was convicted of and the
procedural history surrounding his appeal for a stay of execution.
67 See id.
6 id.
69 Johnson v. Reid, 540 U.S. 1097 (2003) (denying an application to vacate the stay of
execution). Reid was eventually executed on September 9, 2004.
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court's published opinions reveals a number of opinions addressing issues raised in
second motions for rehearing.70 Nevertheless, not only did the Fifth Circuit decline
to write an opinion or an order denying the motion, the court literally refused to
accept it. The court would not even docket the motion. Indicating that she had been
instructed to do so by the court, the Fifth Circuit clerk returned the original and all
required copies to counsel for Vickers and Zimmerman.
In 2004, a pattern began to emerge. On January 6, 2004, Texas executed Ynobe
K. Matthews, but Matthews had been - in the argot of death penalty lawyers - a
volunteer, having refused to authorize any appeals to be filed on his behalf.7 ' The
first scheduled execution for a non-volunteer was the impending execution of
Kenneth Bruce, set to die on January 14, 2004. In the meantime, the State of North
Carolina had executed Raymond Rowsey on January 9, 2004.72 A panel of the
Fourth Circuit, bound by the prior panel's action in the Reid case,73 had originally
halted the execution. The North Carolina Attorney General asked the Supreme
Court to intervene, and the Court dissolved the stay of execution by a vote of five-
to-four.74 It was not immediately clear what distinguished Nelson and Reid, on the
one hand, from Rowsey's case, on the other. Next, the State of Oklahoma executed
Tyrone Darks on January 13, 2004." Darks had received a stay from the Tenth
Circuit on grounds similar to the stay issued by the Fourth Circuit in the Reid case.
The Supreme Court dissolved the stay by a vote of five-to-four.76 On January 14,
2004, the State of Ohio executed Lewis Williams, Jr.77 A panel of the Sixth Circuit,
by a vote of two-to-one, had declined to follow the Fourth Circuit's lead in Reid.78
The dissenting judge argued that it was inappropriate for the execution to go forward
in a case where the inmate had raised the precise procedural question that the
70 See, e.g., United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S.
823 (1997); Ates v. Commissioner, 672 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1982); Fry v. Estelle, 527 F.2d
420 (5th Cir. 1976); Jenkins v. United States, 298 F.2d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
928 (1962).
71 See Ynobe Katron Matthews, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/deathUSI
matthews886.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
72 See Raymond Dayle Rowsey, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htm/death(US/
rowsey888.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
" See, e.g., Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371
(1998).
74 See Beck v. Rowsey, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004).
71 See Tyrone Peter Darks, at http:/lwww.clarkprosecutor.orglhtmlldeath/US/darks-
889.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
76 See Ward v. Darks, 540 U.S. 1146 (2004).
77 See Lewis Williams, Jr., at http:llwww.clarkprosecutor.org/htmlldeath/US/williams-
890.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2004).
78 See In re Williams, 359 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 2004).
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Supreme Court would review in Nelson.79 Williams's lawyers asked the Supreme
Court for a stay. It was denied by a vote of five-to-four.'
Bruce was set for execution in Texas on the same day Williams was executed
in Ohio. Although Bruce, Vickers, and Zimmerman each had independent counsel,8 '
the same set of lawyers represented all of the inmates in connection with the lethal
injection litigation. For perhaps obvious reasons, the lawyers unbundled the cases
of the three Texas inmates set for execution in January. Their plan was to use
lessons learned from litigating one case when litigating the next. If one inmate got
a stay, the tactics employed to obtain it would be repeated; if the inmate was
executed, the tactics would be modified.
Yet, the modifications did not seem to be making a difference in the cases
outside of Texas. During early January, a clear pattern of five-to-four denials had
emerged. It was possible that the stay that had stood up in Reid was an anomaly,
without any significant analytical distinctiveness. But it was also possible that there
was a coherent explanation, albeit an elusive one. If there was some coherent theory
that explained Nelson and Reid, on the one hand, and the five-to-four denials from
Oklahoma, Ohio, and North Carolina, on the other, then the fates of Vickers,
Zimmerman, and Bruce hinged on the ability of their lawyers to figure out what that
theory was.
Unfortunately for Bruce, the most likely factor that seemed responsible for the
stay in Reid was the likelihood that Reid, like Nelson, would be subjected to a cut-
down procedure, and Bruce had no viable claim that he would be subject to that
practice. Consequently, lawyers from Bruce attempted to coax the four Justices who
had voted to grant stays into voting to grant certiorari. If they could obtain a certiorari
grant, they would then approach the state courts and ask the state courts for a stay
of execution in view of the willingness of the Supreme Court to rule on the merits
of the procedural issue. 2 However, when the Texas courts refused to grant a stay
7 See id. at 814-16 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
81 See Williams v. Taft, 540 U.S. 1146 (2004).
81 Each of the inmates scheduled for execution in January was also represented by
appointed counsel. Bruce was represented by Mike Charlton, of Santa Fe, New Mexico.
Vickers was represented by Keith Hampton, of Austin, Texas. Zimmerman was represented
by Richard Ellis, of San Francisco, California. These three lawyers also worked on the lethal
injection litigation, while simultaneously pursuing avenues unrelated to the lethal injection
challenges; a discussion of those other avenues is outside the scope of the this Article.
82 Astonishingly, there had previously been a Texas death penalty case where an inmate
scheduled for execution, whose petition for writ of certiorari had been granted, was unable
to secure a fifth vote for a stay of execution from the Supreme Court. Ex parte Herrera, 828
S.W.2d 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In Herrera, the Supreme Court had granted the inmate's
petition for certiorari by the vote of four Justices on the day of his scheduled execution,
though there had not been a fifth vote to provide a stay. However, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals (CCA) entered an order vacating the execution date. Thereafter, the trial
court entered an order setting another execution date for Herrera. As the new date
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even in advance of the Supreme Court's vote in the case,83 Bruce was out of options.
His stay motion in connection with the lethal injection litigation was denied by the
now routine vote of five-to-four, and he was executed on January 14, 2004.
Attention now turned to Zimmerman. He was scheduled for execution a week
after Bruce. The jurisdictional argument standing alone did not appear to be gar-
nering stays. Like Reid and Nelson, however, Zimmerman had been a serious
intravenous drug abuser, and there were legitimate questions about the condition of
his veins. He had complained in many forums about the prospect of a cut-down
procedure. His lawyers therefore believed that his best hope for a stay was to
emphasize the potential use of that procedure to make his case more like the cases
of Nelson and Reid, and less like the cases of the four inmates who had been
executed following the Supreme Court votes of five-to-four. However, that
approach failed as well. Thus, on January 21, 2004, five and one-half weeks after
Justice Scalia stayed his original date, Zimmerman was executed when the Supreme
Court, by a vote of five-to-four, declined to issue a new stay.' When Zimmerman
was executed, members of Vickers's family were outside the prison protesting.
They realized that the fate of their relative was deeply connected to that of
Zimmerman, and Zimmerman's death gave them no reason to be hopeful.
Vickers's lawyers had a week to think of something to distinguish his case. The
problem they faced was that, following the Zimmerman execution, there was simply
no good theory as to why Reid's stay had held up while all the others were denied.
Two things did seem clear, however. First, the procedural question alone - the
question the Supreme Court was set to address in Nelson - would not result in a
stay. 5 Second, the issue relating to the arguable unconstitutionality of the
chemical mixture used to carry out lethal injections was not of sufficient interest
approached, Herrera filed an application for a stay of execution with the CCA, asking the
state court to issue a stay in view of the pendency of the case before the Supreme Court. The
CCA issued a stay, noting that "it would be improper for this Court to allow applicant's
execution to be carried out before his petition for writ of certiorari is fully reviewed by the
Supreme Court." Id. at 9. Herrera is therefore authority for the proposition that if the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case, Texas courts will preclude the execution of
a death row inmate whose case the Court has already decided to review.
83 Bruce had filed a Writ of Prohibition in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Petition
for Writ of Prohibition Or, In the Alternative, Application for Stay of Execution, State ex rel.
Bruce v. Dretke, No. WR-43,165-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2004). That writ was denied
while the petition for writ of certiorari was still pending.
'4 See Zimmerman v. Johnson, 540 U.S. 1159 (granting stay of execution), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1208 (2004).
83 The Court may have perceived that the routine issuance of stays on the procedural
question would have the consequence of halting the death penalty pending the decision
in Nelson.
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to five Justices to merit a stay, even though there did appear to be four votes to
grant certiorari.8 6
But Vickers' s case was unique. On December 9, 2003, he had become the only
person in the history of the death penalty in Texas not to be executed despite the
existence of a valid death warrant that was neither rescinded nor stayed. The lethal
injection claim was not going to get him a fifth vote for a stay, but Vickers's lawyers
decided that perhaps one Justice might be persuaded by a claim arising out of the
facts of December 9, 2003, and that Justice, in combination with the four who had
dissented in all the lethal injection cases over the preceding month-and-a-half, would
be sufficient to keep Vickers alive until the Supreme Court decided the jurisdictional
question in Nelson. The gist of the claim arising out of the events of December 9,
2004, was that the State's failure to inform Vickers that it was not going to go
forward with the execution for more than three hours after it had made the decision
not to go forward constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that the State's new
attempt to carry out his execution amounted to double jeopardy.
Vickers had new substantive arguments, but he faced a procedural dilemma.
The highest Texas state criminal court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA),
adheres to a doctrine it calls the "two-forum rule."8' Under this rule, the CCA
refuses to adjudicate any case where there is an identical or closely related issue
pending in federal court.8" Consequently, were Vickers to have filed his action in
federal court, the state courts would perhaps have refused adjudication. However,
in the face of the way his case had already been treated by the Fifth Circuit - first
by that court's refusal to rule on the motion for rehearing en banc on the night of the
scheduled execution and then by that court's refusal to docket Vickers's second
motion for rehearing following the Fourth Circuit's action in Reid - Vickers's
lawyers were reluctant to place all their eggs in the federal court basket. So the
action was filed in state court on Friday, January 23, 2004 - less than two days
following the Zimmerman execution. The following Monday, January 26, Vickers's
lawyers lodged his § 1983 suit in federal court, still reluctant to file it officially in
view of the state's two-forum rule.89 Late Monday afternoon, the clerk for the CCA
86 See supra note 64 (discussing the rule of four used by the Supreme Court to review
petitions for certiorari).
87 See infra note 90 (discussing the two forum rule).
88 See infra note 90. The doctrine has been recently modified, but not in a way that would
have had any impact on the lethal injection litigation. See Exparte Soffar, 143 S.W.3d 804
(Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
89 Also on Monday, January 26, 2004, Vickers moved in the court of appeals for a stay
of execution pursuant to Fifth Circuit Local Rule 8.9, which provides for stays of execution
when:
there is a reasonable probability that 4 members of the Supreme Court
would consider the underlying issues sufficiently meritorious for the
grant of certiorari and... there is a substantial possibility of reversal
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informed Vickers's counsel that the CCA would be taking no action until, at the
earliest, the next day. Vickers's lawyers could wait no longer and filed the federal
lawsuit first thing Tuesday morning."
By mid-afternoon, the district court had dismissed the suit. However, Vickers's
counsel did not immediately receive a copy of the district court's order. Counsel
assumed that the district court followed circuit precedent and construed the § 1983
action as a habeas petition just as different district courts had done in the Bruce and
Zimmerman cases. Vickers's counsel further assumed that because the Fifth Circuit
had not authorized a successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the district court
had concluded that it lacked jurisdiction. Vickers's lawyers had confronted this very
disposition during the lead-up to the first scheduled execution of December 9, 2003,
and again during the Bruce and Zimmerman executions in the preceding two weeks.
of [the Fifth Circuit's] decision, in addition to a likelihood that
irreparable harm will result if its decision is not stayed.
5TH CIR. R. 8.9, available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerkldocs/5thCir-IOP.pdf (last
visited Sept. 9, 2004). The fact that four Justices had dissented from all the denials of
motions for stays of execution over the preceding month suggested that those four were
willing to grant certiorari on the issue; nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit summarily denied the
Rule 8.9 motion several hours after it was filed.
9o Texas law pertaining to the filing of a second or successive habeas petition in state
court is similar to federal law, except that a second or successive petition may be authorized
even if the inmate does not raise a claim of actual innocence. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 11.071 § 5 (Vernon 2003). The CCA will authorize a death row inmate to file a
successive habeas petition if the inmate can establish that "the current claims and issues have
not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in
a previously considered application filed under this article... because the factual or legal
basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application."
Id. § 5(a)(1). See generally Exparte Davis, 947 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
On Tuesday afternoon, before the federal district court ruled, the CCA refused to
authorize Vickers to file a successive state habeas petition. By a vote of seven-to-one, with
one judge not participating, the CCA ruled that although the claim relating to the events of
December 9 was unavailable when Vickers filed his previous state habeas application,
Vickers had not shown that he was entitled to relief. For reasons beyond the focus of this
Article, that is a bizarre ruling, in that the CCA's role is simply to determine whether a
successive petition is authorized, not to evaluate the substantive merits of the petition. See
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.071 § 5(a) (Vernon 2003). If the CCA determines that
a subsequent petition is authorized under state law, the trial court is to consider whether relief
is warranted. See, e.g., Exparte Lewis, No. 44725-02,2003 WL 21751491 (Tex. Crim. App.
July 24, 2003). The CCA did not adhere to this customary procedure in the Vickers case.
The CCA further held that the claim relating to the constitutionality of the chemical mix
used in carrying out a lethal injection was not unavailable when Vickers first sought state
habeas relief, and therefore could not be brought in a successive petition. Ex parte Billy
Frank Vickers, No. 39-015-03 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/Opinions-Non%2Published/3901503.htm (last visited Dec.
16, 2004).
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As a result, an appeal to the Fifth Circuit was already prepared. The clerk of the
Fifth Circuit called counsel to ask whether there would be any filing in the court of
appeals, and counsel told her that there would be. The clerk informed counsel that
it would have to arrive by 5:00 p.m., when the court would close for the day. At
approximately 4:30 p.m., counsel sent an appeal via e-mail to the clerk's office.
Minutes later, counsel finally received a copy of the district court's order.
As it happened, the district court had not disposed of the case the same way it
had in the prior § 1983 litigation in December 2003, nor had the court acted in the
same way as the district courts in the Bruce and Zimmerman litigation. Instead,
following a practice used in several other federal circuits,9' but not the Fifth Circuit,
the district court purported to transfer the case to the Fifth Circuit, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1631.92 That section provides:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in
section 610 of this title ... and that court finds that there is a
want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of
justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in
which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time
it was filed.. ., and the action... shall proceed as if it had been
filed in.. .the court to which it is transferred ....
This ostensible transfer order created a serious jurisdictional issue that Vickers' s
counsel had not anticipated, and that was therefore not addressed at all in the
appellate papers they had prepared. For example, the Fifth Circuit had held that a
transfer order issued under § 1631 is not an appealable interlocutory order. 4 Yet it
was critical that Vickers' s lawyers be permitted to appeal the district court's order:
if the action they filed in district court was properly construed as a second or
successive habeas petition that had to pass through the § 2244 gateway, then the
Supreme Court would not review the Fifth Circuit's judgment because the AEDPA
provides that the decision of a court of appeals not to authorize a second or
successive petition "shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition
for... writ of certiorari."95 In other words, the fact that the district court purported
to transfer the case, rather than dismiss it, placed an unanticipated impediment to
getting the issue ultimately before the Supreme Court. Counsel immediately phoned
91 See, e.g., Brown-Bey v. Ray, 55 Fed. Appx. 508 (10th Cir. 2003); Robinson v.
Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003); In re Sims,
111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1997); Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir.
1997).
92 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000).
93 id.
94 Brinar v. Williamson, 245 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2001).
95 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E) (2000).
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the clerk for the Fifth Circuit and informed her that they did not wish to file the
appeal that they had sent via e-mail minutes earlier. She informed counsel that the
document would not be filed, and she asked when an appeal would in fact be sent.
Vickers's lawyers assured her that it would be sent first thing the following morning,
Wednesday, January 28, 2004.
There were now three questions Vickers's lawyers had to address: the
availability of an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to raise a challenge to events that
had transpired on December 9, 2003; the applicability of the gateway provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 2244;96 and whether the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction, a question that
arose because of the district court's order purporting to transfer the case. Vickers' s
lawyers divided up the work and began rewriting the appeal, focusing in significant
part on the third issue (relating to transfer) - the only issue that had been com-
pletely unexpected. Shortly before 8:00 p.m. the fax machine rang, and an order
started to arrive from the Fifth Circuit. The lawyers assumed this would be good
news. No appeal had been filed, and the only thing an order could do, therefore,
was stay the execution. As it happened, that was not what the Fifth Circuit did. A
two-judge quorum issued an order that disposed of all "anticipated" filings by
Vickers. The Fifth Circuit order held that (i) the district court properly rechar-
acterized the § 1983 action as a subsequent habeas petition; (ii) the gate-keeping
provisions of § 2244(b)(2) had not been satisfied and authorization to file a
subsequent habeas application was therefore denied;97 (iii) Vickers's claims relating
96 The argument will be discussed in greater detail in the following section. The essence
of the claim was that should the court construe the pleading as a § 2254 application, the
application was not "second or successive" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
Vickers's argument was predicated in part on the Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Cain, 137
F.3d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1998), which held that a later petition challenging the admin-
istration of a sentence filed by a prisoner who had previously filed a habeas petition
challenging the validity of his underlying conviction and sentence was not "second or
successive" and, therefore, did not implicate the AEDPA's gate-keeping provisions.
9' Had Vickers actually filed a pleading in the court of appeals prior to the time that court
ruled against him, he would have filed an appeal of the district court's order, not a motion
for authorization to file a successive habeas petition. The Fifth Circuit nevertheless treated
his case as if it were a second or successive petition that was required to pass through the §
2244 gateway. What makes the Fifth Circuit's resolution of the case still more astonishing,
if that is possible, is that in treating the case as one that was required to comply with § 2244,
the Fifth Circuit then proceeded to abrogate that very section.
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit decided the case by a two-judge quorum. The plain
language of the AEDPA, however, prohibits the courts of appeals from deciding motions for
authorization by two-judge panels. According to the statute: "A motion in the court of
appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second or successive
application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
The various provisions contained in AEDPA demonstrate that Congress knows how to
allow fewer than three judges to resolve an issue when it so wants. For example, in 28 U.S.C.
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to the events of December 9, 2003, would be denied; and (iv) all anticipated requests
for a stay of execution would be denied. Peculiarly, the quorum also ordered that
any motion for rehearing be physically filed by 10:00 a.m. central time the following
day, even though Vickers had still not filed his original appeal.
The district court's opinion had literally ignored - i.e., not mentioned a single
word about - Vickers's argument that even if the action was properly rechar-
acterized as a habeas petition, it was not subject to the gate-keeping provisions of
§ 2244. Nearly one-third of the legal memorandum Vickers filed in federal district
court addressed this very issue. The Fifth Circuit likewise stated nothing about this
issue, perhaps because that court simply did not know that Vickers was even making
this argument, having disposed of his appeal before the appeal was ever filed. The
Fifth Circuit did not even address the issue of its own jurisdiction, perhaps because
it had not read the lower court's order carefully enough to realize that the court had
purported to transfer the case (rather than dismissing it), or because Vickers's
lawyers had never actually filed an appeal discussing that very issue.
Vickers elected not to seek further review in the Fifth Circuit, and instead filed
a stay application and a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. At
approximately ten minutes before six, the Court denied the stay by a vote of five-to-
four.98 Vickers was executed several minutes thereafter. He was pronounced dead
shortly after 6:00 p.m.
H. THE ARGUMENTS THAT VICKERS'S EXECUTION LEFF UNANSWERED
In this section we briefly lay out the specific arguments Vickers sought to have
adjudicated in order to illuminate the daunting difficulties that face death row
§ 2253(c)(1), Congress provides that "a circuit justice or judge" can issue a certificate of
appealability. More significantly, the version of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)
originally adopted by Congress as part of AEDPA stated that a request for a certificate of
appealability "shall be considered by a circuit judge or judges as the court deems
appropriate." Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Reading these provisions in pari
materia with § 2244(b)(3)(B), which is appropriate because they were all enacted as part of
the same legislation, it becomes particularly evident that Congress knew how to give the
circuit courts flexibility to have a panel of fewer than three judges decide some habeas
matters but consciously chose to require a three-judge panel to conduct the gate-keeping
function for successive petitions. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 249-50 (1998)
(recognizing appropriateness of inpari materia construction of AEDPA's "requirements for
certificates of appealability and motions for second or successive applications [because they]
were enacted in the same statute"); Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29-30 (1997)
("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citations omnitted).
9' See Vickers v. Johnson, 540 U.S. 1212 (2004) (denying certiorari).
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inmates who seek to obtain review of issues that involve facts that were not in
existence at the time they filed their original habeas applications. We begin by
briefly sketching the substantive aspects of the claims Vickers raised, i.e., the Eighth
Amendment claim relating to lethal injection, the Eighth Amendment claim relating
to whether the expiration of the death warrant on December 9, 2003, constituted
torture that precluded the state from later executing him, and the Fifth Amendment
claim relating to double jeopardy. We then turn to the two procedural questions:
one dealing with whether challenges like his are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the other dealing with whether - assuming such actions are properly characterized
as habeas actions - suits like Vickers's are subject to the gate-keeping provisions
of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
A. Lethal Injection
Our objective in this section is to sketch briefly the essence of the claim that the
chemical combination used to carry out a lethal injection in Texas violates the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause. The factual underpinnings of the argument have
been addressed in the scholarly literature at some length. 9 We stress at the outset
that the challenge Vickers sought to bring was not to the method of lethal injection,
per se. It was therefore different from challenges to the use of the electric chair,
which asserted that electrocution constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, or to
other broad, generalized challenges to a particular mode of execution. 1° ° Had
Vickers prevailed, Texas would have been permitted to execute him by lethal
injection; it would simply have been required to alter the chemical combination used
to achieve that end.
The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
forbids the infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of a death sentence.'
0
'
9 See supra note 34.
'o See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444-49 (1890) (stating that execution by
electrocution is not unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); see also Buell v. Mitchell,
274 F.3d 337, 370 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that execution by electrocution is not cruel and
unusual); Langford v. Day, 134 F.3d 1381, 1382 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that execution by
hanging is not cruel and unusual); Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333, 337 (8th Cir. 1997)
(passing an electrical current through the body more than once is not cruel and unusual
punishment); Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327, 1337-38 (4th Cir. 1995) (asserting that execution
by lethal gas is not unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1054
(1996); O'Bryan v. McKaskle, 729 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (asserting that execution
by lethal injection is not unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain).
101 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,463 (1947); Fierro v. Gomez, 865
F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (Execution by lethal gas in California was uncon-
stitutional where evidence indicated "death by this method is not instantaneous. Death is not
'extremely rapid[]' or 'within a matter of seconds.' Rather.. . inmates are likely to be
conscious for anywhere from fifteen seconds to one minute from the time that the gas strikes
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One example of unnecessary pain is a protracted killing; thus, a punishment is cruel
if it involves "a lingering death."'" It is one thing if a protracted execution occurs
inadvertently or rarely; it is quite another if a certain punishment will foreseeably
cause suffering. A punishment that involves the foreseeable infliction of suffering
is particularly constitutionally offensive. 0 3 This argument - that lethal injection in
Texas will foreseeably cause a lingering death and excruciating suffering - formed
the essence of the challenge that Vickers and others before him sought to have
adjudicated. Although no court addressed the merits of the claim, the merits are not
easily dismissed.
As currently practiced in Texas, Virginia, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, and
several other states, lethal injection causes unnecessary pain, a lingering death, and
torture. The basic physiology of the claim is not new. On the contrary, evidence
has existed for at least fifty years that the "drugs used in lethal injections pose a
substantial threat of torturous pain to persons being executed."' '4 In Chaney v.
Heckler, the Court of Appeals found that
[a]ppellants have presented substantial and uncontroverted evi-
dence to support their claim that execution by lethal injection
poses a serious risk of cruel, protracted death... Even a slight
error in dosage or administration can leave a prisoner conscious
but paralyzed while dying, a sentient witness of his or her own
slow, lingering asphyxiation.'05
In the litigation in Texas involving Bruce, Zimmerman, and Vickers, officials
acknowledged that the Texas lethal injection protocol has not changed since it was
first used in 1982. " But the Eighth Amendment has an additionally salient strand:
punishments that are permissible at a given historical moment may become un-
their face," and "during this period of consciousness, the condemned inmate is likely to
suffer intense physical pain" from "air hunger," whose symptoms "include intense chest
pains .... acute anxiety, and struggling to breath [sic].") (citation omitted), afftd, 77 F.3d 301
(9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 918 (1996).
102 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
103 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1973) (stating that if the failed execution in
Resweber had been intentional and not unforeseen, "the punishment would have been, like
torture, so degrading and indecent as to amount to a refusal to accord the criminal human
status").
" Chancy v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1983), overturned on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Id. at 1191 (citation omitted).
's Judge Denies Stays ofThree Executions; SuitArgues 3-Drug Combo Inhumane, Hous.
CHRON., Dec. 9, 2003, at A29 (quoting a Texas Department of Criminal Justice official who
acknowledges that no changes have been made to the procedure in place since 1982).
[Vol. 13:521
EXTRAORDINARY EXECUTION OF BILLY VICKERS
constitutional at a later time because the constitutional value embodies society's
evolving standards of decency. 7 As the Court has observed throughout the entire
history of death penalty litigation, "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man .... The Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society."' ' What changed in the two decades following the first notice
that the chemical mix used in many states to inflict lethal injection could cause
torture was a movement away from the use of those very chemicals in the
euthanizing of pets.'09 If evolving standards of decency, as reflected by legislative
action and the professional association of veterinarians, prohibit the use of these
particular drugs when killing a dog or a cat, then those same standards of decency
would certainly require a more humane, readily available version of the lethal
injection for human beings as well. One could perhaps argue that animals that are
euthanized are "innocent," in some philosophic sense, and deserve better than a
convicted murderer. That argument would of course be a position on the merits of
the Eighth Amendment issue. In the litigation pursued by Vickers, Zimmerman, and
Bruce, however, no discussion of the merits ever occurred.
Texas carries out lethal injections by administering a combination of three
chemical substances: sodium thiopental, or sodium pentothal (an ultrashort-acting
barbiturate); pancuronium bromide, or pavulon ("a curare-derived agent which
paralyzes all skeletal or voluntary muscles, but which has no effect whatsoever on
awareness, cognition or sensation");". and potassium chloride (a chemical which
activates the nerve fibers lining the person's veins, causes great pain, and can
interfere with the rhythmic contractions of the heart and cause cardiac arrest)." Far
from producing a rapid and sustained loss of consciousness and humane death, this
particular combination of chemicals often causes the inmate to suffer an excru-
ciatingly painful and protracted death, and to be conscious while so dying." 2
Sodium thiopental, or sodium pentothal, is a short-acting barbiturate that is
ordinarily used only in the induction phase of anesthesia to render a surgical patient
unconscious for mere minutes. "' In ordinary surgery, the agent's short-acting
characteristic is desirable because it facilitates the reawakening of the patient who
"o See supra note 35 (discussing roots of "evolving standards of decency" strand of death
penalty jurisprudence).
'08 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311-12 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958)).
,'9 See infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
"0 See Keith Hampton, 2003: A Legal Perspective: Death Penalty Litigation: Lethal
Injections in Texas, 67 TEX. B.J. 60 (2004) (explaining that pancuronium bromide is "a
curare-derived agent which paralyzes all skeletal or voluntary muscles").
"' Id.
12 Id. at 61.
,13 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 480-81 (57th ed. 2003).
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will be able to breathe on his own power if any complications arise in inserting a
breathing tube before surgery." 4 Because of its brief duration, sodium thiopental
may not provide a sedative effect throughout the entire execution process." 5 Dr.
Dennis Geiser, the chairman of the Department of Large Animal Clinical Sciences
at the College of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Tennessee, recently
explained:
[s]odium thiopental is not a proper anesthetic for use in lethal
injection. Indeed, the American Veterinary Medical Association
standards for euthanasia indicate that the ideal barbituric acid
derivative for use in euthanasia should be potent, long acting,
stable in solution, and inexpensive. Sodium pentobarbital (not
sodium thiopental) best fits these criteria. Sodium thiopental is
a potent barbituric acid derivative but very short acting with one
therapeutic dose." 6
Due to the chemical combination used in the Texas execution process, some
probability exists that the sedative effect of the sodium thiopental is neutralized
by the second chemical, pancuronium bromide.' 17 As Dr. Mark Heath, Assistant
Professor of Clinical Anesthesia at Columbia University states:
Sodium thiopental is an ultra short-acting barbiturate. It would
not be used to maintain a patient in a surgical plane of anesthesia
for purposes of performing surgical procedures. It is unneces-
sary, and risky, to use a short-acting anesthesia in the execution
procedure. If the solution of Sodium thiopental comes into
contact with another chemical, such as pancuronium bromide,
the mixture of the two will cause the sodium thiopental immedi-
ately to precipitate or crystallize. These factors are significant
in the risk of the inmate not being properly anesthetized,
especially since no-one checks that the inmate is unconscious
before the second drug is administered."'
"4 See Why Lethal Injection Is Inhumane and Cruel Punishment, Campaign to End the
Death Penalty, at http://www.castine.net/lethal%20injection.htm (last visited Dec. 16,2004)
[hereinafter Why Lethal Injection Is Inhumane].
"5 See id.
16 Affidavit of Dr. Dennis Geiser, Texas v. Jesus Flores, No. 877,994A.
"' See Why Lethal Injection Is Inhumane, supra note 114.
Il Affidavit of Dr. Mark Heath, Texas v. Jesus Flores, No. 877,994A.
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Concerns about using sodium thiopental are heightened by the lack of medical
personnel, the lack of proper monitoring of the inmate during the process and the
lack of inmate-specific dosing of the barbiturate. "9 According to Dr. Geiser:
[T]he dosage [of thiopental sodium] must be measured with
some degree of precision, and the administration of the proper
amount of the dosage will depend on the concentration of the
drug and the size and condition of the subject. Additionally, the
drug must be administered properly so that the full amount of
the dosage will directly enter the subject's blood stream at the
proper rate. If the dosage is not correct, or if the drug is not
properly administered, then it will not adequately anesthetize the
subject, and the subject may experience the untoward effects of
the neuromuscular blocking agent used.
20
Moreover, drug manufacturers warn that without careful medical supervision of
dosage and administration, sedatives can cause "paradoxical excitement" and can
heighten sensitivity to pain.' Manufacturers warn against administration by intra-
venous injection unless a patient is unconscious or out of control.' 22
The second chemical involved in the lethal injection process, pancuronium
bromide, or pavulon, is a derivative of curare that acts as a neuromuscular blocking
agent. 1 23 If the sedative effect of the sodium thiopental is ineffective or neutralized,
the pancuronium bromide would serve only to mask the excruciating pain of the
condemned inmate. 2
Pancuronium bromide makes the patient look serene because of
its paralytic effect on the muscles. The face muscles cannot move
or contract to show pain and suffering. It therefore provides a
"chemical veil" over the proceedings. By completely paralyzing
the inmate, pancuronium bromide masks the normal physical
parameters that an anesthesiologist or surgeon would rely upon
to determine if a patient is completely unconscious and within
a proper surgical plane of anesthesia. Because pancuronium
bromide is an invisible chemical veil and not a physical veil like
"1 See Why Lethal Injection Is Inhumane, supra note 114.
120 Affidavit of Dr. Dennis Geiser, Abdur'Rahman v. Bell, 226 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2000),
cert. granted on other grounds, 535 U.S. 981, and cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
537 U.S. 88 (2002) (emphasis added).
121 PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE, supra note 113, at 480-81.
122 See id. at 482.
123 See supra note 110 (describing pancuronium bromide).
124 See Why Lethal Injection Is Inhumane, supra note 114.
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a blanket or hood that is easily identifiable, the use of pan-
curonium bromide in lethal injection creates a double veil. It
disguises the fact that there is a disguise over the process.'
In Abdur'Rahman v. Bell,'26 Dr. Geiser asserted that "[w]hile Pavulon paralyzes
skeletal muscles, including the diaphragm, it has no effect on consciousness or the
perception of pain and suffering."'2' Administration of pavulon is "like being tied
to a tree, having darts thrown at you, and feeling the pain without any ability to
respond."'28 This assertion is corroborated by the experience of eye surgery patient,
Carol Weihrer.' 29 During Ms. Weihrer's surgery, the sedative she received was
ineffectual, and Ms. Weihrer was conscious of the entire surgery. 30 Due to the
administration of a neuromuscular blocking agent like pancuronium bromide,
however, she was unable to indicate her consciousness to doctors:
I experienced... what has come to be known as Anesthesia
Awareness, in which I was able to think lucidly, hear, perceive
and feel everything that was going on during the surgery, but I
was unable to move. It burnt like the fires of hell. It was the
most terrifying, torturous experience you can imagine. The
experience was worse than death. 3
In short, the second chemical, pancuronium bromide, or pavulon, in the lethal
injection protocol serves no purpose in carrying out the execution. Its adminis-
tration serves only to mislead witnesses of the execution, who believe that they are
seeing someone being "put to sleep," when in fact they are observing a human being
experience the painful and ravaging consequences of potassium chloride. 132 The
125 Affidavit of Dr. Mark Heath, Texas v. Jesus Flores, No. 877,994A.
126 Abdur'Rahman, 226 F.3d 696.
127 Affidavit of Dr. Dennis Geiser, Abdur'Rahman, 226 F.3d 696 (emphasis added).
I2 d.
129 Affidavit of Carol Weihrer, Texas v. Jesus Flores, No. 877,994A.
130 id.
131 id.
132 [P]ancuronium bromide creates the serene appearance that witnesses
often describe of a lethal injection execution, because the inmate is
totally paralyzed. The calm scene that this paralysis ensures, despite the
fact that the inmate may be conscious and suffering, is only one of the
many controversial aspects of this drug combination.
Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind
State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 63, 100 (2002).
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witnesses remain unaware because the inmate, paralyzed by the pancuronium
bromide, cannot express his agony.
133
Of course, the chemical agents themselves that are used in carrying out lethal
injections have been used for two decades. Yet, there have been recent legislative
changes that bear on the constitutionality of their continued use. Since 1981, at least
nineteen states, including Texas, have passed laws that preclude the use of a sedative
in conjunction with a neuromuscular blocking agent in the euthanasia of animals."3
Moreover, in 2000, the leading professional association of veterinarians promul-
gated guidelines for euthanasia that prohibit the practice. 3 Those guidelines
specifically state that "[a] combination of pentobarbital with a neuromuscular
blocking agent is not an acceptable euthanasia agent."'136 It is at least arguable that
a euthanasia practice widely considered unfit for a dog is, pursuant to the evolving
standards of decency component of the Eighth Amendment, also unfit for humans.
This argument rooted in the idea of "evolving standards of decency" had
especial resonance in Texas because the Texas legislature had been the most recent
legislative body to enact legislation mandating humane methods of euthanizing
animals, which preclude the use of neuromuscular blocking agents such as
pancuronium bromide.' With this legislation, Texas joined numerous states with
laws recognizing that use of these chemicals would be inhumane in the euthanasia
of dogs and cats.' 38 Moreover, in addition to forbidding explicitly the use of a
sedative with a neuromuscular blocking agent, the American Veterinary Medical
Association (AVMA) stressed that only personnel trained and knowledgeable in
anesthetic techniques should administer potassium chloride (the third drug in
133 Id.
134 See infra note 139.
135 2000 Report of the American Veterinary Medical Association Panel on Euthanasia,
218 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASSN 669, 681 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 AVMA Report].
136 Id. at 680.
137 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 821.052 (Vernon 2003) (prescribing the
methods of euthanasia for cats and dogs in the custody of animal shelters and requiring that
shelters euthanize all other animals "only in accordance with the applicable methods,
recommendations, and procedures set forth in the 2000 Report of the American Veterinary
Medical Association Panel on Euthanasia").
138 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 828.058, 828.065 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 4-11-5.1
(1995); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1044 (West 1987); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §
10-611 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 151(A) (West 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
4.22-19.3 (West 1987); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. § 374(2)(b) (Consol. 2004); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 4, § 501 (West 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-303 (2000). Other states have
implicitly banned such practices. See 510 ILL.COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/2.09 (West 2004); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 47-1718(a) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:2465 (West 2003); MO. CODE
REGS. ANN. tit. 2, § 30-9.020(14)(F)(5) (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-34 (1998); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-344(a) (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 8001 (2001); KY. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 321.207 (Michie 2004); 201 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 16:090, § 5(1) (2004); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 47-3-420 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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Texas's lethal injection procedure) in conjunction with any anesthesia. 39 According
to the AVMA:
It is of utmost importance that personnel performing this tech-
nique are trained and knowledgeable in anesthetic techniques,
and are competent in assessing anesthetic depth appropriate for
administration of potassium chloride intravenously. Admin-
istration of potassium chloride intravenously requires animals
to be in a surgical plane of anesthesia characterized by loss of
consciousness, loss of reflex muscle response, and loss of res-
ponse to noxious stimuli."4
Statutes in at least five other states in addition to Texas also expressly refer to
the AVMA guidelines when delimiting humane methods of animal euthanasia. 4'
Vickers and others who raised the claim objecting to the chemical mix used in the
lethal injection protocol were therefore relying on contemporary developments that
reflect a recent turn against the use of these drugs. Such an argument is a classic
Eighth Amendment claim because "[a] claim that punishment is excessive is judged
not by the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over the
'Bloody Assizes' or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by those that
currently prevail."' 142 In Atkins, which held that states cannot execute the mentally
retarded and thereby overruled a decision from thirteen years earlier that had
identified no such prohibition,' 43 the Supreme Court emphasized that "evolving
standards of decency" are best reflected in the various relevant laws enacted
throughout the country." The Court characterized state legislation as the "clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values."' 45
The unmistakable trend over the past two decades of condemning the use of
neuromuscular blocking agents, such as pancuronium bromide, in euthanasia is clear
evidence, Vickers argued, that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment. These recent alterations of euthanasia protocols for
139 2000 AVMA Report, supra note 135, at 681.
140 id.
141 See 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2.09 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1718(a) (2000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:2465(c)(1) (West 1985); MO. CODEREGs. ANN. tit. 2, § 30-9.020(F)(5)
(2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1-34 (1998).
14 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002). The scope of the substantive protections
afforded by the Eighth Amendment, as the Court recently reiterated, is defined by "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Id. at 312 (quoting Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
"" Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
'44 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting Trop, 336 U.S. at 101).
14' Id. at 311 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 331).
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animals underscore the inhumanity of the chemicals currently used in Texas. The
problem for an inmate like Vickers is that these recent developments had yet to
transpire when he was sentenced to death or when he originally pursued federal
habeas corpus relief. As a result, it became dauntingly difficult, if not impossible,
for him to pursue it later.
B. Other Constitutional Claims Relating to the Events of December 9, 2003
Although the two Texas death row inmates who originally raised the lethal
injection challenge with Vickers attempted to obtain federal review of that single
issue, Vickers occupied a somewhat different position prior to his demise because
of the events that he uniquely experienced on December 9, 2003, when his original
death warrant expired. Consequently, prior to Vickers's execution on January 28,
2004, he also attempted to obtain federal review of two additional issues, both
occasioned by the expiration of the death warrant.
Vickers did not argue that the State of Texas should have executed him on
December 9, 2003, when the Fifth Circuit refused to rule on his pending motion for
en banc review. He did argue, however, that the State of Texas had an obligation
to inform Vickers that it had decided not to go forward with the execution as soon
as that decision was reached, and that the State's action - pretending as if the
execution would go forward for more than three hours after a decision to the
contrary had been reached - amounted to unconstitutional torture.
Vickers's claim that grew out of the events of December 9, 2003, relied on a
strand of Eighth Amendment doctrine that is well over a century old. As early as
1878, the Court observed that the Eighth Amendment forbids torture as well as
unnecessary cruelty." In Gregg v. Georgia,14 Justice Stewart explicitly extended
this principle to death penalty jurisprudence, noting that the American draftsmen of
the Eighth Amendment "were primarily concerned ... with proscribing 'tortures."48
All prisoners who are executed probably undergo some degree of apprehension
and fear, but Vickers's case was singularly different. Though he did not obtain a
stay of execution, he was not executed. Further, the State continued to act as if he
would be executed on December 9 for three or more hours after the decision not to
go forward had been reached. His experience is less like ordinary apprehension and
more like purposeful psychological torture. That no physical pain was inflicted
upon Vickers is of no moment, for the Supreme Court has long recognized that the
146 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("[It is safe to affirm that punishments
of torture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by [the
Eighth Amendment] to the Constitution.").
"47 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
141 Id. at 170.
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Constitution proscribes psychological as well as physical torture. 149 And mock
executions are perhaps the quintessential illustration of impermissible psychological
torture. '50
To be sure, there are times that the execution protocol will need to be carried out
twice, through no fault of the state. For example, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber,"' an equipment malfunction prevented the state from carrying out the
execution of an inmate on whom the execution process had begun. The Supreme
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prevent the state from making
a second attempt at carrying out the electrocution.' But the Court noted in
Resweber that the failure to execute the prisoner was unintentional and accidental.
Indeed, Justice Frankfurter, who provided the necessary fifth vote in Resweber,
insisted that "different questions" would have been raised had the facts demon-
strated that the first attempt to carry out the execution had been something other than
"an innocent misadventure.
1 5 3
"9 See, e.g., Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 (stating that expatriation as penalty for desertion
"subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress"); Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 349-51 n.15 (1981) (explaining that possible psychological problems of
inmates factored into Eighth Amendment analysis); Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 16
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I am unaware of any precedent of this Court to the effect
that psychological pain is not cognizable for constitutional purposes [under the Eighth
Amendment]. If anything, our precedent is to the contrary."); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 271-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (concluding that the imposition of the death
penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment). In addition, the Court in Furman stated
that "the Framers also knew 'that there could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those
which inflicted bodily pain or mutilation."' Id. at 271 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 372 (1910)).
150 Mock executions and other threats of imminent death are widely recognized to be a
form of unconscionable torture. Legislation passed by the United States Congress on April
30, 1994, implementing the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, identifies "the threat of imminent death"
as a form of torture. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C) (2000). This provision was designed to bring
"mock executions" within the ambit of the legislation. David P. Stewart, The Torture
Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law Within the United States, 15
NOVA L REV. 449,455-56 (1991). The United States Department of State likewise recognizes
mockexecutions to be a form of torture. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993, S. PRT. 103-7 (Joint Comm. Print 1994)
(recognizing mock executions as a form of torture in Chad, Sudan, Moldova, Liberia, and
Colombia), available at http:/dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/democracy/1993-hrp--report/93hrp-re-
porttoc.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2004). Finally, federal courts themselves have recognized
mock executions as forms of torture. See Acree v. Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D.D.C. 2003);
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
' 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
.52 Id. at 465-66.
.. Id. at 470-72 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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In Vickers' s case, there was certainly no "innocent misadventure." Whether the
State tortured him in violation of the Eighth Amendment is a question that has no
ready answer because the merits of his claim were never addressed. The claim was
certainly plausible, however; and just as certainly, the claim could not have been
brought in Vickers's original habeas proceeding.
Vickers raised a second constitutional claim as well. That claim was that the
Double Jeopardy Clause precluded his execution. 54 The double jeopardy guarantee
is applicable not only to trials, but also extends to any proceeding that results in the
imposition of punishment for criminal conduct.'55 Once Vickers was scheduled to
be put to death by lethal injection on December 9, 2003, he was placed "in jeopardy
of life."' 56 Absent a development that had the legal effect of erasing the death
warrant that created that jeopardy, he could not be placed in such jeopardy again.
Fifth Amendment law distinguishes between "double'jeopardy and "continuing"
jeopardy, and only the former is proscribed.'" Thus, if the execution warrant of
January 28 constituted "continuing jeopardy," then it raised no viable Fifth Amend-
ment concerns. 8 However, because the December 9, 2003, death warrant in his
case was neither withdrawn nor nullified by a stay of execution, there was no event
that could be analogized to the "continuing jeopardy" that results when a convicted
felon obtains an appellate reversal.'5 9 Instead, the warrant expired by governmental
acquiescence, thereby terminating the execution of judgment. When the warrant
expired at that moment, jeopardy for his life was terminated in a way analogous to
an acquittal. Vickers attempted to argue that the same values that underlie the
Double Jeopardy Clause entailed that the State not be permitted to go forward with
his execution on January 28, 2004. Among other interests, the double jeopardy
preclusion serves a "constitutional policy of finality for the defendant's benefit."''"
Further, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects citizens from repeated subjection "to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling [them] to live in a continuing
"5 The Fifth Amendment provides: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This guarantee is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
'51 See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994); United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
156 See, e.g., Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323,326 (1970) (explaining the application of the
continuing jeopardy principle).
157 Id.
151 See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669-71 (1896). See also United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (stating that the retrial after defendant successfully appealed
is no "act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the Double Jeopardy Clause
was intended to protect").
159 See Price, 398 U.S. at 326.
"6 United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
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state of anxiety and insecurity." 161 Whether the Double Jeopardy Clause was
intended to apply to the execution of a death warrant, or whether Vickers would
have prevailed on the merits of this constitutional question are probably close
questions.
Indeed, with respect to both Vickers's Eighth Amendment and Fifth Amendment
claims, it seems likely that had the merits of either claim been reached or even
addressed by a court, the sheer perversity of the claims would have militated against
finding in Vickers's favor. Yet, the claims Vickers raised relating to the events of
December 9 were arguably perverse, not because the underlying legal theories
were particularly exotic; on the contrary, both claims were rooted in well-
established strands of Eighth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. The claims were
perverse simply because the factual predicate that gave rise to them is exceedingly
unusual - so unusual that there is no documented instance of its ever having
occurred before.
We cannot know whether the claims Vickers sought to have reviewed would
have succeeded because the merits of the claims were never addressed. Yet we can
be certain of two things. The first is that, unlike the lethal injection claim, which
rested on the proposition that the standards of decency had evolved such that a
punishment that had previously been permissible no longer was so, the claims
relating to December 9, 2003, were rather plebian. The second is that these plebian
claims grew from an extraordinary event that transpired a mere seven weeks before
Vickers died. Vickers could not have brought these claims terribly much sooner
than he did. Now, we turn to this timing issue.
IV. FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER NEW CLAMS
Under the AEDPA, a death row inmate generally can file only a single federal
habeas petition.16 According to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, a federal court is required to dis-
miss any petition that raises claims already decided.1 63 The statute does contemplate
additional federal habeas petitions that raise claims based on new developments, but
the only new developments that the statute identifies are those based on so-called
new rules of constitutional law or those establishing that the death row inmate is
actually innocent. 64 According to the statute:
161 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
'62 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000).
163 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (2000).
"6 See id. How the actual innocence component of § 2244(b) pertains to claims that an
inmate is innocent of the sentence, which was Vickers's argument following the events of
December 9, has not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court. In Sawyer v. Whitley, 505
U.S. 333 (1992), the Supreme Court held in a pre-AEDPA case that, in the context to a
challenge of a death sentence in federal post-conviction proceedings, a death row inmate
shows that he is "actually innocent" by establishing that no reasonable juror would have
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(b)(1) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed.
(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed unless -
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light
of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error,
no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty
of the underlying offense.165
The claims that Vickers sought to have adjudicated after December 9, 2003, were
not based on new rules and thus did not satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(A). Nor did Vickers
challenge the reliability of either his conviction or sentence - meaning that his
claims also did not satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). As a result, when Vickers,
Zimmerman, and Bruce sought to challenge the use of certain chemicals in the lethal
injection cocktail in early December 2003, there was no way they could satisfy the
§ 2244 gate-keeping provisions.
But why did they need to? Habeas relief is available to inmates who are
challenging the legality of their detention. 28 U.S.C § 2254 provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
found him eligible for death under applicable state law. See also Haley v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d
569, 570-72 (5th Cir. 2003) (Smith, J., dissenting) (rejecting the court's denial of petition
for rehearing en banc by noting that the Supreme Court has not discussed the meaning of
"actual innocence" of the death sentence under AEDPA), vacated on other grounds, Dretke
v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386 (2004); Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that Sawyer has been codified in the AEDPA), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1236
(2003). Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,663-64 (1996) (adopting a miscarriage ofjustice
standard that is consistent with AEDPA's central concerns); Calderon v. Thompson, 523
U.S. 538, 558-60 (1988).
165 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
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violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.'"
Vickers, Zimmerman, and Bruce were not claiming that they were "in custody in
violation of the Constitution of laws or treaties of the United States."' 7 Nor were
they claiming that the State was precluded from executing them,168 or even that the
State was precluded from using lethal injection as the mode of execution. 69 Their
challenge was to the use of a specific component of the lethal injection mixture, a
component not necessary to the carrying out of their execution. Consequently, the
lawsuit these inmates filed in December 2003 was not an action under § 2254, and
so the inability to pass through the § 2244 gateway is irrelevant. If their action was
not a habeas action, however, what was it?
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Vickers, Zimmerman, and Bruce filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
creates a cause of action against state officials for the violation of "any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United
States].' 70 If, as Vickers and his co-plaintiffs alleged, the chemical combination
that the State intended to use to carry out their executions would cause unnecessary
pain and torture, then under well-established Eighth Amendment principles, that
chemical combination would violate the Constitution by amounting to cruel and
unusual punishment. 7 ' Section 1983 permits a court to order injunctive relief in
order to correct such a constitutional violation. When these rights are violated, §
1983 creates an action for damages and injunctive relief for the benefit of any citizen
of the United States against the state actor responsible for the violation.
72
166 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000).
167 Id.
"6 See, e.g., Sawyer, 505 U.S. 333.
9 See Gomez v. Fierro, 519 U.S. 918 (1996).
170 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
171 See supra text accompanying notes 99-145.
172 Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439,443 (1991) (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978)). The Supreme Court has "given full effect to
[the statute's] broad language [by] recognizing that § 1983 'provide[s] a remedy... against
all forms of official violation of federally protected rights."' Id. at 445. See also Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The secondary
literature on § 1983 litigation is vast. For especially valuable recent contributions, see, e.g.,
Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and
Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1311 (2001); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1015
(2004); Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003).
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As a general proposition, a federal court has the power to issue injunctive relief
when four conditions are satisfied: (1) a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction is not granted; (3) the threatened injury to the plaintiff out-
weighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to the defendant; and (4) granting
the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.7 3 These same
criteria govern the issuance of equitable relief in actions predicated on 42 U.S.C. §
1983. ' Each of these four conditions was seemingly satisfied in the lethal injection
litigation. The substantive claim the parties sought to litigate was, as the Fifth
Circuit conceded, substantial, and there appeared to be a substantial likelihood that
they would prevail on the merits; their injury would obviously be irreparable; the
injunction would do no harm to the State because it could carry out the execution
with a different chemical combination; and it is difficult to see how the public
interest is disserved by prohibiting the use of a chemical agent that offends the
Constitution.
Neither the federal district court nor the Fifth Circuit ruled against the litigants
on the merits. Instead, in the Bruce and Zimmerman cases, the federal district court,
relying on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Martinez, 75 characterized the action as a
habeas action, then dismissed the petition for not having been authorized pursuant
to § 2244.116 In Vickers, in a wrinkle, the district court also characterized the action
as a habeas petition, but rather than entering an order of dismissal, the court
purported to transfer the case to the Fifth Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. In
each case, the Fifth Circuit similarly treated the challenge as a habeas action, and
denied authorization under § 2244.11 In none of the judicial proceedings did the
court explain why the action was even appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, much
less why it was inappropriate under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Although it takes a tortured reading of § 2254 to insist that an action challenging
the use of a certain chemical for lethal injection constitutes a habeas action, and
although it takes a similarly perverse reading of § 1983 to conclude that such an
action cannot be brought under that statute, what is even more astonishing about the
' O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,502 (1974); Lindsay v. San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103,
1105 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1010 (1988); Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d
567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 1974).
114 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972); Tex. Catastrophe Prop. Ins. Ass'n
v. Morales, 975 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1018 (1993); Byrne
v. Roemer, 847 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir. 1988); Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 254 & n.5
(5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974).
175 292 F.3d 417 (5th Cir. 2002).
176 See Andrew Hammel, Death-Penalty Appeals and Post-Conviction Proceeding:
Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction Counsel: Cutting the
Gordian Knot, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 347, 387 (2003).
177 Id.
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executions of Vickers, Zimmerman, and Bruce - not to mention the half dozen or
more death row inmates in Ohio, Florida, Oklahoma, and North Carolina who were
also executed while attempting to raise the same issue - is that the Supreme Court
was already poised to address the very jurisdictional issue presented in all these
cases. In Nelson v. Campbell, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve:
Whether a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a
death-sentenced state prisoner, who seeks to stay his execution
in order to pursue a challenge to the procedures for carrying out
the execution, is properly recharacterized as a habeas corpus
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254? 171
Prior to the decision in Nelson, there was a split among the circuits with regard to
whether any action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a death-sentenced prisoner
that did not challenge the conviction or sentence should nonetheless be treated as a
successive habeas corpus petition. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits had concluded
that a challenge to the method of execution was properly brought as a § 1983 action.
According to the Ninth Circuit, "[t]o hold otherwise would carve out of habeas and
§ 1983 law a separate jurisprudence for death penalty cases. There is no authority
for such a dichotomy."'79 In contrast, the Fifth Circuit had held that similar actions
by a death-sentenced prisoner when there is an impending execution must be brought
as habeas petitions."'
To be sure, Vickers and his cohorts were seeking an equitable remedy, and a
party who seeks equity is held to certain standards. 8' One such standard is that the
1' Nelson v. Campbell, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003).
... Fierro v. Gomez, 77 F.3d 301,304 (9th Cir.), vacated, 519 U.S. 918 (1996). See also
Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining that an action regarding
interference by a state official in clemency proceedings is properly brought as a § 1983
action); Wilson v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 161 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998)
(denying a motion to vacate a temporary restraining order granted by a district court to hear
a § 1983 action regarding clemency proceedings); Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058 (10th
Cir.) (considering a § 1983 action regarding clemency procedures), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1061 (1998); Booker v. Murphy, 953 F. Supp. 756, 762 (S.D. Miss. 1997) ("The Court is
thus persuaded that the Plaintiffs' challenge in this case to the manner in which their sentence
of death will be carried out, that is, by lethal gas, is properly cognizable under section
1983."); Otey v. Hopkins, 5 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246 (1994).
'g Martinez, 292 F.3d at 423 ("Accordingly, § 1983 challenges to an impending execution
(like § 1983 challenges to a state's method of execution or § 1983 challenges seeking
immediate or speedier release from prison) must be brought as habeas actions."), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1091 (2002). See also Beets v. Tex. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 205 F.3d
192, 193 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that challenges to clemency proceedings must be pursued
by a writ of habeas corpus).
181 See, e.g., Dunlop-McCullen v. Local I-S, 149 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing
principles of equity).
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lawsuit not be brought for purposes of delay.8 2 The delay issue gave rise to the
question of whether Vickers had waited too long. Should Vickers, Zimmerman, and
Bruce have filed suit earlier, and, by delaying, were they precluded from obtaining
equitable relief?' 3
To begin with, it is by no means certain that a party - even a death row in-
mate - can agree to an unconstitutional punishment.' If the litigants were correct
on the merits of their claim, then even if they had delayed bringing the suit, the
court was still authorized - and even required - to grant relief, for the simple
reason that no matter how dilatorious their behavior, they were incapable of
acceding to an impermissible punishment.
More to the point, however, the litigants were actually quite diligent in pursuing
relief. In arguing to the contrary, the State relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Gomez v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California,8 5
in which the Supreme Court refused to decide whether a suit challenging the state's
method of execution should have been brought as a habeas action or a suit under §
1983 and instead held that the death row inmate, who had filed four habeas actions,
could have included the claim in one of his previous filings. Vickers' s lawsuit was
clearly distinguishable from Gomez for at least four reasons. First, unlike Gomez,
Vickers was not challenging the mode of his execution. Gomez had argued that
execution by lethal cyanide gas is inherently unconstitutional. 6 Consequently,
once he was sentenced to death in a state (California) where lethal injection was the
prescribed mode of execution, his challenge to the inherent unconstitutionality of
lethal injection immediately ripened. In contrast, however, whereas Gomez's chal-
lenge to the mode of execution ripened as soon as sentence was pronounced, it is
difficult to say exactly when Vickers's action ripened. Although Texas law pre-
scribed lethal injection as the mode of execution at the time Vickers was sentenced
to death, the statute did not specify (nor does it specify today) the precise chemical
combination to be used in carrying out the execution. 7 The decision relating to the
chemical combination is left to prison authorities, and they are free to change the
mixture as they see fit. Vickers's action under § 1983 was not ripe until the State
had announced that it intended to carry out his execution using a specific mixture
of chemicals. 8 8 Prior to that time, his injury was speculative. If Vickers had
182 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes.
183 The State argued that the parties could not obtain equitable relief because they had
waited too long. See Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653 (1992).
" Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he consent
of a convicted defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment
otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.").
185 503 U.S. at 653-54.
186 Id. at 653.
187 See TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 43.14 (Vernon 2004).
188 See, e.g., Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868
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obtained relief from either his conviction or sentence in his habeas proceedings, or
if the State had elected not to use pancuronium bromide as part of the lethal
injection drug combination, then his challenge to the particular chemical combi-
nation would never have ripened.
Second, it was not until the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Nelson case
that Vickers had any potentially available procedural vehicle for raising his Eighth
Amendment challenge. The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Nelson until
December 1, 2003.' 89 Until that time, Vickers was foreclosed from pursuing his
challenge by Fifth Circuit precedent, which had held since Martinez that § 1983 is
not an appropriate vehicle for challenges to the method of execution."
Third, insofar as the Eighth Amendment challenge to the lethal injection mixture
hinged on so-called "evolving standards of decency,"'' Vickers had no substantive
argument until the evidence of those evolving standards had become manifest. The
evidence that supported Vickers's argument that "evolving standards of decency"
now preclude the use of these well-known chemicals is of relatively recent vintage.
For example, the Report of the American Veterinary Medical Association Panel on
Euthanasia, deeming a combination of a neuromuscular blocking agent and a
barbiturate as "not an acceptable euthanasia agent," was only released in 2000 and
was not published in the Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association
until March 1, 2001.'92 The Texas law adopting the AVMA guidelines took effect
on September 1, 2003.'93 Another state explicitly prohibited the use of such drugs
only during the two years immediately preceding Vickers's execution."9 In the
context of an Eighth Amendment challenge premised on "evolving standards of
decency," the recentness of these events is of singular importance.
Finally, whatever comments one might have about the timing of the suit
challenging lethal injection, clearly Vickers could not have raised his claims arising
out of the December 9, 2003, events any sooner. One additional point should be
mentioned. Gomez was decided in 1992, before passage of the AEDPA.' 95 That
statute dramatically restricted the universe of claims that can be brought in
(1994); Bowman v. Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 940
(1993); Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1984).
Nelson, 540 U.S. 1046 (denying certiori).
190 See Martinez, 292 F.3d at 423 (holding that "§ 1983 challenges to an impending
execution (like § 1983 challenges to a state's method of execution or § 1983 challenges
seeking immediate or speedier release from prison) must be brought as habeas actions"), cert.
denied, 535 U.S. 1091 (2002).
1 ' See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
'92 2000 AVMA Report, supra note 135.
'" TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 821.052 (Vernon 2004).
,94 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-303 (2003).
'95 See Baker v. Duckworth, No. 96-1851, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 10805, at *3 (7th Cir.
1997) (stating that the "[riecent amendments for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)... replace the doctrine
of the 'abuse of the writ' that was announced in Gomez).
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successive habeas petitions.' 96 Under the AEDPA, as mentioned above, a claim can
be raised in a subsequent petition only if it involves a new rule or relates to actual
innocence.'97 A question presented by the Vickers litigation was whether the
restrictions placed on the filing of subsequent habeas petitions by 28 U.S.C. § 2244
should somehow be grafted on to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 when a death row inmate
attempts to file suit under that latter statute. It would indeed be extraordinary to
hold that death row inmates are prevented from seeking judicial redress for
constitutional violations as a consequence of their residence on death row.'98
Vickers filed his action under § 1983 because the relief he was requesting
cannot form the basis of an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He filed it when he did
because the standards of decency had evolved to such an extent that the Eighth
Amendment argument was colorable, and because the Supreme Court's grant of
certiorari in the Nelson case in December 2003 had breathed life into § 1983 as a
procedural vehicle. Even, however, if § 1983 and § 2254 are to be read to require
all death row inmates to use habeas actions for any complaint they wish to lodge,
Vickers should still not have been required to pass through the § 2244 gate-keeping
provisions. Some court should have addressed the merits of his claim. It is to the
issue of § 2244 that we now turn.
B. Second or Successive Petitions and § 2244
If the federal courts correctly concluded that a lawsuit challenging the chemical
mixture to be used in carrying out a lethal injection must be brought as a habeas
action, and if an inmate seeking to challenge the chemical mixture has already filed
an original habeas petition, then the question is whether a new habeas petition,
challenging the chemical mixture, must pass through the gate-keeping provisions of
§ 2244.' In Vickers's case, the additional question was whether the claims that
were based on the events that occurred on December 9, 2003, also had to pass
through the § 2244 gateway. The question arises more frequently than one might
expect. For example, a death row inmate whose mental condition significantly
deteriorates while confined to death row, and who therefore becomes incompetent,2n
will need to raise this competency question subsequent to his original habeas
application. Defining the types of claims that must pass through the § 2244 gate-
keeping provision is therefore a matter of some importance. Prior to the enactment
of the AEDPA, there was no statutory bar to filing second or successive habeas
196 See supra notes 162-69 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
198 On the contrary, in Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996), the Court
emphasized that courts are not to abandon the normal "statutes, rules, precedents and
practices" in capital cases, but rather are to adhere to them.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 43-47.
200 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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petitions. 2° ' A death row inmate who had pursued habeas relief without success
could file another habeas petition.2° Judicially crafted rules made it somewhere
between exceedingly difficult and utterly impossible for an inmate to prevail on a
subsequent writ, but the federal courts did have jurisdiction to entertain them.2 3
That is no longer the case.2 0° 28 U.S.C. § 2244 provides that a federal district court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain a second or successive habeas petition, unless a three-
judge panel of the relevant court of appeals authorizes the filing of the petition." 5
Section 2244 therefore serves as a gateway to the filing of second or successive
habeas petitions; a death row inmate who cannot satisfy those gate-keeping pro-
visions will not be able to vest a federal court with jurisdiction to entertain his writ.
Under the plain language of § 2244(b)(2), the AEDPA's gate-keeping provi-
sions only apply to "second or successive" habeas petitions. The statute does not
define that phrase. In several post-AEDPA cases, however, the Supreme Court has
emphasized that Congress did not write upon a clean slate when it enacted the
AEDPA and that Congress intended to codify the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
governing successive petitions. Consequently, the Court has interpreted the
AEDPA's provisions governing "second or successive" habeas applications by
looking to the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.2 "
Whether a habeas petition is "second or successive" within the meaning of
§ 2244 depends on whether that same petition would have been deemed "second or
successive" under the Court's pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine. Relying on
201 See generally Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post Conviction Relief Alter-




204 See generally 1 RANDY HERTz & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2001); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas
Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 381 (1996).
205 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B) (2000).
206 See, e.g., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651,664 (1996) (noting that AEDPA's restrictions
on successive petitions "constitute a modified res judicata rule, a restraint on what is called
in habeas corpus practice 'abuse of the writ'); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637,
645 (1998) (Quoting Felker's "abuse of the writ" language, the Court noted that "[it is
certain that respondent's Ford claim would not be barred under any form of res judicata"
because "[r]espondent brought his claim in a timely fashion, and it has not been ripe for
resolution until now."); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486 (2000) (explaining that,
"[b]ecause the question whether Slack's petition was second or successive implicates his
right to relief in the trial court, pre-AEDPA law governs, . . . though we do not suggest the
definition of second or successive would be different under AEDPA," and citing Martinez-
Villareal for the proposition that courts must use "pre-AEDPA law to interpret AEDPA's
provision governing 'second or successive habeas applications"') (citations omitted).
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the Supreme Court's language in Felker,2°7 Martinez-Villareal,°5 and Slack,2°9 a
number of circuits have interpreted the concept embodied in the phrase "second or
successive" in light of the pre-AEDPA equitable principles underlying the abuse-of-
the-writ doctrine.21° That is, if the petition filed by the death row inmate would not
have been barred by the pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, then that petition
is not second or successive within the meaning of § 2244.1
Under the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, a subsequent petition is "second or
successive" when it raises a claim that was, or could have been, raised in the initial
petition. 12 In the context of the lethal injection litigation, if the standards of
decency upon which the inmates were relying had already evolved by the time they
filed their original habeas application, then, if the action must indeed be brought in
a habeas petition (as distinguished from § 1983), they would have been barred by
the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine from subsequently raising this claim. That means that
their habeas petition, if it was properly characterized as a habeas petition, had to
pass through the § 2244 gateway. In contrast, if the claim did not become viable
until various legislatures had banned pancuronium bromide in the carrying out of
animal euthanasia, then the claim could not have been raised in the inmates' original
habeas petitions, and was therefore not "second or successive" within the meaning
of § 2244. Moreover, it should go without saying that the claims Vickers sought to
raise based on the events of December 9, 2003, could not possibly have been raised
207 Felker, 518 U.S. 651.
208 Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637.
209 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473.
210 See, e.g., James v. Walsh, 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002); Hill v. Alaska, 297 F.3d
895,897-98 (9th Cir. 2002); Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720,723-25 (8th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34,42-45 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1176 (2000); In
re Taylor, 171 F.3d 185, 187-88 (4th Cir. 1999); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235-37 (5th Cir.
1998); Reeves v. Little, 120 F.3d 1136, 1139 (l0th Cir. 1997).
211 Only the Seventh Circuit has taken a contrary position:
The doctrine of abuse of the writ is defunct. The term derives from
section 2244(b), now wholly superseded by the new law [i.e.,
AEDPA], which nowhere uses the term. There is no longer any
statutory handle for the doctrine, and in any event its role seems wholly
preempted by the detailed provisions of the new statute concerning
successive petitions.
Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 990
(1997).
212 See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493-95 (1991). In addition, a claim raised in
an earlier habeas petition, but dismissed as premature, is not subject to the gate-keeping
provisions of § 2244(b)(2). See Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 643-45. Similarly, a petition
filed after a mixed petition has been dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies before
the district court adjudicated any claims "is to be treated as 'any other first petition' and is
not a second or successive petition." Slack, 529 U.S. at 487 (quoting Marinez-Villareal, 523
U.S. at 644).
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or anticipated at the time of his original habeas petition, so it is difficult even to
imagine the thinking that required those claims to pass through the § 2244 gateway.
The abuse-of-the-writ doctrine is sometimes viewed as a res judicata principle.
Consequently, in cases where a death row inmate has filed a new habeas petition,
and it would not make sense to view the new claims raised in that petition as barred
by the doctrine of res judicata, the courts have declined to characterize the new
petition as second or successive."' Perhaps the quintessential type of action that
could not have been raised previously is one based on so-called conditions of
confinement; an inmate who complains about the way he is being treated on death
row is complaining about a fact that was not in existence when he initially pursued
federal habeas relief. That challenge to conditions is therefore not "second or
successive" within the meaning of § 2244."4
Neither Vickers nor any of the other inmates in Texas or elsewhere who
challenged the use of pancuronium bromide had a substantial Eighth Amendment
challenge prior to the movement of many states to ban the use of the chemical in
animal euthanasia. The litigants' claims, therefore, could not have been brought
when they initially sought habeas relief because the claim simply did not yet exist;
213 See, e.g., James, 308 F.3d at 168 ("[W]hen a subsequent habeas petition contains both
a new claim that could not have been raised in a prior petition and a claim that was pre-
viously raised, we deem such petition 'first' as to the new claim and 'second' as to the old
claim."); Hill, 297 F.3d at 899 ("The Supreme Court's teachings on § 2244, the well-
reasoned decisions of our sister circuits, and the logical application of the 'second or
successive' petition rule lead us to adopt the rule embraced by the Fifth and Eight Circuits
in Cain and Crouch."); Crouch, 251 F.3d at 725 (A "petition, which neither raises a claim
challenging [petitioner's] conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in his
earlier petition, nor otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ, is not 'second or successive'
for purposes of § 2244(b)."). See also Cain, 137 F.3d 234.
Congress did not intend for the interpretation of the phrase 'second or
successive' to preclude federal district courts from providing relief for
an alleged procedural due process violation relating to the
administration of a sentence of a prisoner who has previously filed a
petition challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence, but is
nevertheless not abusing the writ.
Id. at 236-37; RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. Supp. 1997).
Applying the no-second-bite rule makes no sense when a prior petition
gave the prisoner what amounts to no bite at the apple - because the
prior petition involved a different apple, because no bite was taken
when the apple previously was before the court, or because no bite
could have been taken at that time because the claim had not yet come
into existence or would not have been cognizable at the time of the
earlier petition.
Id. § 28.3a, at 275 (emphasis in original).
114 Cain, 137 F.3d at 236-37.
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the standards of decency had not yet sufficiently evolved. Consequently, insofar as
the lethal injection claim could not have been brought when the death row inmates
initially sought habeas relief, their complaint, even if properly characterized as a
habeas action, should not have had to pass through § 2244 s.21 The Fifth Circuit
invoked an inapplicable jurisdictional barrier to avoid addressing an issue of serious
constitutional magnitude.
The Fifth Circuit's behavior in the lethal injection cases was even more stunning
in Vickers's case, for even if one were to conclude that the lethal injection claim
could have been brought sooner, that conclusion certainly could not have applied to
Vickers's claims arising out of the events of December 9, 2003. To understand what
was happening in this litigation, some sense of why Vickers was unable to obtain
a ruling on the merits of those additional claims must be had. We reflect on that
very issue in the following concluding section.
CONCLUSION: THE BANALITY OF DEATH
Like Bruce and Zimmerman and the inmates executed outside of Texas in
December 2003 and January 2004, Vickers was a bad guy. He did not raise a factual
innocence claim. He admitted that he committed the murder he was accused of
committing. What his case finally illustrates is that when the courts confront a case
brought by a death row inmate who raises no innocence claim, the courts tend to pay
it little attention. This tendency is doubly ironic. The first layer of the irony is that
in Herrera v. Collins,"6 the Supreme Court suggested that a naked claim of factual
innocence - that is, a claim of innocence unaccompanied by an independent consti-
tutional violation - is not even cognizable in habeas review. Herrera, in other
words, states that innocence does not matter. 7 If innocence does not matter, there
are two remaining possibilities. One is that violations of constitutional principles
matter; the other is that nothing does.
The Vickers fiasco tends to suggest that the second alternative is the correct
answer. In the final round of litigation prior to the Vickers execution, the State took
the position that even though Vickers could not have complained prior to December
9 about the events that occurred on that day, he could nonetheless have complained
215 One could perhaps take the position that a party with foresight could have discerned
the developing standard of decency years earlier.
216 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Herrera's suggestion that a naked innocence claim would not
support habeas relief represented a break from previous cases. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 442-44 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986).
217 In yet a further irony, AEDPA does emphasize the salience of actual innocence by
providing that successive petitions may be authorized if newly discovered facts establish
innocence. However, AEDPA does not permit this innocence claim to stand alone; it must
be tethered to an independent constitutional violation. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) (2000).
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substantially sooner than he did.2 8 That assertion seems plausible, until it is
examined.
When Vickers was not executed on December 9, his lawyers had filed neither
a stay motion nor a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Also, the
Fifth Circuit denied the motion for rehearing that was pending the previous evening
as Vickers's death warrant expired.219 Consequently, there was a Fifth Circuit
judgment that Vickers's lawyers could attempt to take to the Supreme Court, and
indeed, on December 10, Vickers's lawyers informed the State that they intended
to file a petition for writ of certiorari.220
Despite knowing of Vickers's intentions, the State nonetheless scheduled his
execution for January 28, 2004. As recited above, Vickers was not the first Texas
death row inmate to be scheduled to die in the new year. Ynobe Matthews was
scheduled for January 6, Kenneth Bruce was scheduled for January 14, and Kevin
Zimmerman was scheduled for January 21.221 Matthews was not planning on filing
any challenges to his execution; there was therefore no prospect that Vickers's
lawyers could learn anything useful from observing his case. In contrast, Bruce and
Zimmerman both planned to raise the lethal injection challenge in new litigation.
The same group of lawyers represented each of these inmates. Rather than place the
fates of all their clients on a single legal theory and litigate all three cases
concurrently, the lawyers made the decision to litigate the cases serially, using
lessons from earlier cases to alter or modify tactics in subsequent cases. In other
words, they did what any prudent lawyer would do.
Once the calendar for the entire month of January is taken into account, it is
apparent that the earliest date on which Vickers' s lawyers could have filed an action
on his behalf was January 22, the day after Zimmerman's execution, and the day on
which the lawyers could have modified Vickers's claims based on what happened
in the Zimmerman litigation. And in fact, Vickers filed his challenge on Friday
January 23, less than two days after the Zimmerman execution. Vickers, however,
elected to file his suit in state court, rather than in federal court. Having elected to
do so, he was prevented by Texas law from seeking simultaneous review in federal
court over the same claims he had raised in state court.
As discussed above, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adheres to the so-
called "two forum rule. '222 Under this rule, also known as the Powers doctrine, the
218 Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 6-9, Hines v. Johnson, 83 Fed. Appx. 592 (5th Cir.
2003) (No. 03-21173) (on file with authors).
219 Hines, 83 Fed. Appx. 592.
220 id.
221 Ynobe Katron Matthews, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/US/
matthews886.htm; Kenneth Eugene Bruce, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/
US/bruce891.htm; Kevin Lee Zimmerman, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/
US/zimmerman892.htm.
222 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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CCA will decline to rule on any matter where a parallel action is pending in federal
court.223 The CCA has applied this doctrine even where the pleadings filed in state
court are not identical to the pleadings filed in federal court. At the time of the
Vickers litigation, the CCA was considering modifying this doctrine in the context
of subsequent habeas petitions filed after passage of the AEDPA, but the CCA had
not yet done so.224 In other words, once Vickers opted to attempt to obtain review
in state court, he was prevented from going to federal court until the state court
resolved the case. The CCA ruled against Vickers on Tuesday, January 27, and
Vickers filed his federal lawsuit that same day.
Thus, what actually prevented Vickers from getting to federal court any sooner
than he did was his decision to return to state court, rather than to proceed immedi-
ately to federal court. The question that therefore arises is whether that decision -
the decision to seek state court relief first and go to federal court second - was
itself justified. The answer to this question seems easy. As recounted above, on the
evening when Vickers was originally scheduled to be executed, the Fifth Circuit had
chosen to do nothing, letting a motion for en banc reconsideration sit unresolved
overnight despite the existence of a death warrant commanding the warden to carry
out an execution. It is difficult to fathom such a dereliction of judicial duty. Then
some three weeks later, the court refused to acknowledge a second motion for
rehearing, directing the clerk to return all the material to Vickers's lawyers rather
than addressing the merits of his claim. Vickers's lawyers had good reason to
believe that the state court could not possibly treat their client any worse than the
Fifth Circuit already had, and their judgment was only confirmed by the Fifth
Circuit's subsequent behavior. When the district court ruled against Vickers on
December 27, 2003, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief before Vickers
even filed his appeal or his appellate brief in that court.
Most death row inmates, it is probably safe to say, committed the crimes of
which they were convicted and sentenced to death. Those who are called upon in
our legal culture to interpret and apply the provisions of the Constitution that are
applicable to criminal proceedings, therefore, rarely have the luxury of doing their
work in a case that involves an inmate who is actually innocent. It cannot be easy
223 Exparre Soffar, 120 S.W.3d 344,345 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ("The long time practice
of this Court is to automatically dismiss writ applications when the applicant also has a writ
pending in federal court that relates to the same conviction.") (citing Ex parte Powers, 487
S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Exparte McNeil, 588 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979); Ex parte Green, 548 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). The CCA has since
modified the doctrine somewhat, but not in a manner that would have had any impact on the
lethal injection litigation. See Ex parte Soffar, 143 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(dismissing a writ of habeas corpus).
224 Soffar, 120 S.W.2d at 347-48. This rule is well-known to the federal courts that preside
over Texas death penalty cases. See, e.g., In re Gibbs, 223 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2000); Graham
v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 779 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1097 (2000).
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to be a federal judge who is compelled by the Constitution to rule that an inmate,
whom the judge believes to be guilty and perhaps even a despicable human being,
must receive a new trial, or must be released from death row. Such difficulties,
however, are the price of principle. They arise because this is a nation of laws,
where the rule of law prevails over a particular sentiment. No matter how deeply
the federal judges who presided over the case of Billy Vickers might have reviled
him, their duty was to separate revulsion from their dedication to the enforcement
of constitutional norms. Their duty was to enforce the law.
The Vickers litigation involved death row inmates who did not evoke much
sympathy from the judges who ruled in their cases. Perhaps they did not deserve
much sympathy, but neither we nor the presiding judges should need to be reminded
that this is not the point. And although there are certainly degrees of evil, and the
refusal to enforce the Constitution on behalf of an acknowledged murderer is proba-
bly not equivalent to the act of murder itself; such a refusal remains a failure of both
legal and moral dimensions. Constitutional principles are not solely the possession
of those death row residents whom a judge believes to be innocent or redeemed.
We do not need the Vickers case to teach us that there is murder and evil in our
midst; that we sadly already know. We do need the Vickers case to illuminate a
tragic phenomenon that we remain loathe to concede: federal post-conviction review
of a death row inmate's claims has become perfunctory, and has therefore effectively
ended, in cases where that death row inmate does not proclaim his innocence. The
tragedy of the Vickers case is not simply that innocent victims were murdered; the
further tragedy is that our constitutional principles have ceased to matter when a
death row inmate does not contest his guilt.
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